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This article discusses the Supreme Court’s use of the rhetoric of white innocence in 
deciding racially inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court’s use 
of this rhetoric reveals that it has adopted a distinctly white-centered-perspective which 
reveals only a one-sided view of racial reality and thus distorts its ability to accurately 
appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This article 
examines the Court’s habit of consistently choosing a white-centered-perspective in 
constitutional race cases by looking at the Court’s use of the rhetoric of white innocence 
first in the context of the Court’s concern with protecting “innocent whites” in 
affirmative action cases and second in the context of the Court’s racialization of the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirements regarding the substantive content of the reasonable 
person standard in citizen police encounters.  This article concludes that the Court’s 
insistence on choosing and imposing only one racialized perspective – the white-
centered-perspective—in racially inflected constitutional claims is more than simply bad 
policy, it also constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process clause of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.   This article thus calls for an appreciation of the 
dominance and problematic character of the judicial imposition of a single arbitrarily 
chosen racial perspective in deciding all constitutional race cases. Thus it calls for a 
modification in judicial decisionmaking in which judges become conscious of the white-
centeredness and racial contingency of the white-centered vantage point.  In this way it 
urges a judicial appreciation of multiple levels of racial interpretation in an effort to 
loosen the hegemonic grip of the white-centered-perspective and dilute its power to both 
name and punish, and thereby reduce it from its current dominance into just one more 
option among equally respected racial perspectives competing fairly for judicial 
recognition and legitimization.  
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6Once we see that any point of view, including one’s own, is a point of view, we will realize that every 
difference we see is seen in relation to something already assumed as the starting point. Then we can 
expose for debate what the starting points should be. The task for judges is to identify vantage points, to 
learn how to adopt contrasting vantage points, and to decide which vantage points to embrace in given 
circumstances.1
During the extensive media coverage of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina2 in the 
late summer of 2005, two contrasting media images from flood ravaged New Orleans 
captured the public’s imagination and painfully exposed the stark differences between the 
white-centered and the non-white-centered perspective on racial matters in contemporary 
America.3 The day after the catastrophic flooding, with much of the Gulf Coast in ruins, 
thousands dead and dying, hundreds of thousands homeless, and tens of thousands 
trapped in the flooded city of New Orleans, Yahoo News published two pictures of the 
flood survivors on its website that immediately sparked a national controversy.4 The 
pictures were strikingly similar in content but were accompanied by starkly different 
descriptive captions.  
In one picture, a young black man is shown wading through chest high water 
carrying bundles of food in both hands.  In the other, two young whites, one a man the 
 
1 Id at 15 (“A difficulty here, as always, is who is “we.”  Writing not just for judges, but for all who judge, I 
mean to invoke a abroad array of people in the exploration of justice.  Yet the perspective I advance cannot 
escape my own critique of the partiality of every perspective.”)id. 
2 See Anna Mulrine, To the Rescue: After a Sluggish Response, A Rush to Help and Rebuild, U.S. News 
and World Report, September 12, 2005 p.22 (“It didn’t look like America, the exodus of stunned refugees 
wading through turbid, waist-high water, carrying only what mattered most: sick relatives, bundled babies, 
storm soaked family Bibles. It looked like another country, the kind of place where armed bandits 
outnumber police and desperate families search garbage dumpsters for food. A place where the poorest of 
the poor die in the heat, their corpses ignored on the side of the road.”) 
3 See Evan Thomas, The Lost City, Newsweek, September 12, 2005 page 44 (“The TV images of hundreds 
and thousands of people, mostly black and poor, trapped in the shadow of the Superdome. And most 
horrific: the photographs of dead people floating facedown in the sewage or sitting in wheelchairs where 
they died, some from lack of water.”) It is indeed hard to imagine that if over 100,000 white middle or 
upper class people were trapped in a major American city after a devastating natural disaster, that the 
government would have made them wait for 5-6 without food, water or rescue.  Instead, the enormity of the 
suffering coalesced around the intersection of both class and race.  
 
4 See Clarence Page, When Sluggishness Isn’t OK, Chicago Tribune page 9, September 4, 2005 (“Other e-
mailers sent me copies of two news photos that revealed an apparent double standard regarding black and 
white flood victims in New Orleans.”) 
7other a woman, are also shown wading through deep water and similarly carrying bundles 
of food in both hands.  However, that is where the similarity ends.  The captions describe 
the young black man judgmentally as a “looter;” in sharp contrast the similarly situated 
whites are benignly described as mere “finders.”5
The only difference between the two pictures, and thus the only basis for the 
differences in their respective captions is the apparent racial identity of their subjects.    
Through this “visual rhetoric”6 and racialized narrative, solely by virtue of his blackness, 
the black man is characterized as a criminal, a predator exploiting a tragedy, and thus 
clearly morally blameworthy and deserving of condemnation.  In contrast, solely on the 
basis of their whiteness, the whites are characterized as innocent and perhaps even heroic 
victims, bravely struggling to survive a great natural disaster and thus equally clearly, 
beyond moral blameworthiness or condemnation.   
The difference in these captions reflects a “white-centered” perspective in which 
blacks are seen as inherently criminally suspect and morally undeserving – even of food 
in times of natural disaster.  In contrast, whites are seen as innocent, heroic, and therefore 
implicitly deserving victims struggling against nature.  However, if one views both 
photos from a non-white-centered perspective, they both depict commensurate heroism 
and valor by people struggling in the face of a great national tragedy without the 
 
5The actual captions read: “A young man walks through chest deep flood water after looting (emphasis 
added) a grocery store in New Orleans” and “[t]wo residents wade through chest-deep water after finding
(emphasis added) bread and soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane Katrina came through the area 
in New Orleans.” http://news.yahoo.com/photo/050830/480/ladm10208301530/print and 
http://news.yahoo.com/photo/050830/photos_ts_afp/050830071810_shxwaoma_p (last visited August 25, 
2005); See also, Clarence Page, supra (“Apparently…it’s not looting if you are white.  Such are the 
sentiments and suspicions about race and class that churn just beneath the surface of our daily discourse.”) 
6 See, RICHARD DYER, WHITE (Routledge, 1997) at 44 nt. 4 (describing the “visual rhetoric of 
whiteness.”) 
8necessity of projecting a racialized and stereotyped judgment regarding their worth, 
character or values.7
These conflicting interpretations of essentially the same pictures represent a vivid 
and evocative example of the racially inflected difference between viewing reality from a 
starting point or “white point in space”8 that reflects a racialized white-centered 
perspective as contrasted with one that reflects a non-white-centered vantage point on 
reality; especially racial reality in America.  Part of the difference in these racialized 
perspectives reflects the fact that “the eye that sees is not a mere physical organ but a 
means of perception conditioned by the traditions in which its possessor has been 
reared.”9 Thus, because race and color have such a profound influence on the life 
experiences and life chances of people in America, they also have a profound effect on 
how whites and non-whites10 perceive racial reality.   
This racial influence on perception is particularly important because, in this way, 
race itself can be understood as a “mode of perception”11 or as a distortive lens through 
which reality is perceived that provides the basis for both conscious and unconscious 
“racial judgments…about people’s capacities and worth.” 12 Therefore, because of 
America’s unique history as an “overtly racist regime,”13 and a “white dominated 
 
7 See Clarence Page, supra (“Would the storm victims have been rescued with greater urgency had they 
been mostly white and middle class instead of black and poor?  I don’t have all of the answers, but I’m 
gratified that black people are not the only people who are concerned about the question.”) 
8 RICHARD DYER, WHITE 3 (Routledge, 1997)  
9 MATTHEW FRY JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRATION AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 10 (Harvard University Press, 1998) [hereinafter 
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color]  
10 See RICHARD DYER, WHITE 1 (Routledge, 1997) re: Non-white reference. 
11 Id at 11 
12 RICHARD DYER, WHITE 1 (Routledge, 1997) (These racial judgments are driven by and are 
fundamentally “inextricable from racial imagery [which] is central to the organization of the modern 
world.”) 
13 GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 100-101 (Princeton University Press, 
2002) [hereinafter Fredrickson, Racism] (describing the United States, South Africa, and Nazi Germany as 
9society”14 the dominant and thus default perspective in all public and official space could 
accurately be described as one that is, white-centered, or “white-framed,” and that 
reflects “white-specific characteristics, attitudes and experiences,” and “unexamined 
white ways of thinking about race.”15 Thus the white-centered vantage point presumes 
the “power to name – determine perception, and ultimately, prescription.”16 
The power of the white-centered perspective to “name and determine perception” 
especially in the language and decisions of America’s judiciary, is critically important to 
the future on the nation.  This is because the white-centered perspective constitutes a 
distinctive way of “seeing,”17 or the “accepted but unexamined white ways of thinking 
about”18 and experiencing race in the world.  In this way, the white-centered-perspective 
has come to occupy a “privileged strategic location in a racialized social 
system…[whose] views, fears, and rationalizations take a central position in the overall 
“ideological ensemble” of a society.”19 The problem is that from this central position, the 
white-centered-perspective through “sheer force of naked power…[has] 
 
the only “overtly racist regimes” because “[n]owhere else were the political and legal potentialities of 
racism so fully realized.”) id.  
14 WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 34 (Brown, et. al. eds.) 
(University of California Press, 2003 [hereinafter Brown, Whitewashing Race] 
15 Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987 (1992-93) [hereinafter Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I 
See] 
16 Brown, Whitewashing Race supra at 35 
17 See, DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, 
POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY 14  (Verso, 1994) [hereinafter Roediger, Abolition of 
Whiteness]  (noting “the way many whites see.”) 
18 Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987 (1992-93) (also noting the use of “transparently white-
specific criteria of decision” and “white-specific characteristics, attitudes, or experiences.”) 
19 EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL 
RIGHTS ERA, 62 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) [hereinafter Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy] (noting 
that the “ideological ensemble of a society” consists of “racial, class, and other forms of hierarchical 
structurations…[and that] the focus [here is] exclusively on the racial aspects of the ideological ensemble.”) 
id at 83 nt. 16.   
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foreclose[d]…the common ground upon which we can listen and learn.”20 Thus, as 
Cornel West points out, “the challenge is mustering the courage to scrutinize all forms of 
dogmatic policing of dialogue and to shatter all authoritarian strategies of silencing 
voices…[because] we must respect the scars and wounds of each one of us – even if we 
are sometimes wrong (or right).”21 
The racing process22 in the West generally but in America especially is, “deeply 
embedded in the symbolic and expressive life of the nation, and the narrative 
account[s]”23 that are deployed to describe racial reality.  The depth and intensity of this 
racing process in America is such that, rather than fostering a common national 
perspective it has instead engendered rival and distinctly racialized perspectives or 
“vantage points”24 between white-centered and the non-white-centered perspectives.  
This is a critically important observation because as Malcolm Gladwell has observed, 
when “reduced to its simplest elements, even the most complicated of relationships and 
problems…have an identifiable underlying pattern.”25 This article argues that the central 
“identifiable underlying pattern”26 of racial conflict in America can be described as a 
fundamental “contradiction of perspectives”27 on the nature and experience of racial 
 
20 CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM 6 
(Penguin Books, 2004) (“The major culprit here is not “political correctness,” a term coined by those who 
tend to trivialize the scars of others and minimize the suffering of victims while highlighting their own 
wounds.”) 
21 Id  
22 Cite definition, see Tayyab 
23 GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 88 (Harvard University Press, 
2002) [hereinafter Loury, Anatomy] 
24 Minow, Justice supra at 15 
25 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 141 (Little Brown Publishers, 2005) 
26 Id 
27 Frances V. Rains, Is the Benin Really Harmless? Deconstructing Some “Benign” Manifestations of 
Operational White Privilege, in WHITE REIGN, supra at 80. (citing  J.J. Scheurich, Toward a White 
Discourse on White Racism, Educational Researcher 22, no. 8, 5-10 (1993)) 
11
reality in America28 based not simply on the color of one’s skin, but rather on the color 
and centeredness of one’s personal attitudinal perspective.   As one scholar has argued, 
the stark contrast between the nonwhite experiences and white opinions…stems…from 
liberal individualism’s inability to describe adequately the collective dimensions of our 
experiences.”29 
Thus, the logic of this article suggests that the central racial paradox of the law in 
the twenty-first century consists in reconciling what has been described as “the gap 
between white perception and minority experience,”30 or the rival white-centered and 
non-white-centered racialized perspectives regarding the nature of racial reality.  
However, at the threshold of this paradox is a recognition of the antinomic relationship 
between the white-centered and the non-white-centered perspectives on racial reality – 
and thus the fact that there is something that must be reconciled.  Achieving this goal will 
require dislodging the white-centered-perspective from its current presumptive position 
as the sole arbiter of racial reality.31 This is an essential threshold requirement because a 
truly pluralistic society must not only recognize the rights of those categorized as 
“different,” but it must also reflect a minimally acceptable degree of  respect and dignity 
for the perspectival differences that such status has created and perpetuated.32 
28 Although the non-white perspective consists of multiple racialized subgroups that represent a black, 
Latino, Asian, American Indian perspectives, what they all have in common is that they are not white.  
Thus this article will generally refer to this grouping as the non-white perspective.  However, particular 
racial group perspectives will be identified where the context suggests it might be appropriate.  
29 GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE 
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS, 20 (Temple University Press, 1998) [hereinafter Lipsitz, 
Possessive Investment in Whiteness] 
30 Id  
31 See id, (noting the existence of a “broadly shared narrative about the victimization of “innocent” whites 
by irrational and ungrateful minorities.”)  
32 The logic of the argument advanced in this article is premised on the presumption that the white-
centered-perspective, is not only raced, but also gendered, classed, physically abled, and sexually oriented.  
Thus it a perspective that reflects the experience of those who are white, male, middle class, fully abled, 
and heterosexual. However, for purposes of this discussion, this article will focus primarily on the raced 
12
Thus as one group of scholars has concluded “at the center of the debate over race 
in America is the question of what perspective we will use to define racism and the social 
policies necessary to end it.  From what vantage point will problems be named and 
solutions found?”33 These are critically important concerns in contemporary America 
because as Richard Delgado has presciently observed, “traditional legal writing purports 
to be neutral and dispassionately analytical, but all too often it is not.”34 As Delgado goes 
on to point out, part of the reason for this counterfeit neutrality is due to the fact that 
“legal writers rarely focus on their own mindsets, the received wisdoms that serve as their 
starting points.”35 This “starting point” that Delgado identifies is the ideological and 
perspectival vantage point from which one sees, interprets, and makes sense of reality.  
As this article suggests, these vantage points reflect the racing characteristics of the 
society at large.  It is critical that the law begin to recognize and understand the 
perspectival monopoly that whiteness exerts on the Supreme Court’s view of racially 
inflected cases because, “[t]he supposedly objective point of view” advanced by the 
Court “often mischaracterizes, minimizes, dismisses, or derides without fully 
understanding opposing viewpoints.”36 Moreover, such broad recognition is essential 
because it is axiomatic that “only by acknowledging [the] profound differences in 
[racialized] perspectives can one begin to address the durable racial inequality of 
American society.”37 
aspects of this perspective but it is important to keep in mind that this analysis could apply with equal 
salience and force to any of the other aforesaid categories as well.  
33 WHITE REIGN, supra at 64 
34 Richard Delgado, Storytelling For Oppositionists and Others:  A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2411, 2440-2441 (1989) 
35 Id  
36 Id (“Implying that objective, correct answers can be given to legal questions also obscures the moral and 
political value judgments that lie at the heart of any legal inquiry.”) 
37 WHITE REIGN, supra at 64  
13
It is not surprising that race has such a profound effect on the perception of racial 
reality because, as the nation was starkly reminded by the two contrasting pictures of the 
New Orleans flood survivors,38 “Blacks continue to inhabit a very different America than 
do whites.”39 As a result, “[p]eople’s perspectives on race reflect their experience on one 
side of the color line or the other.”40 Thus, as shown  in a revealing new study on white 
male attitudes on race, “central to the thinking of the majority of whites, in regard 
to…various racial matters is a constant and enduring approach to the social world that is 
centered in and framed from a white-American perspective. It is not just that the racial 
outgroup is viewed as culturally deficient; it is that the viewpoint on this matter is 
consistently white-framed.”41 
This distinction between white-centered and non-white-centered perspectives on 
racial reality has rarely been recognized in the Court’s consideration of racial difference. 
Instead the “legal treatment of difference…tends to treat as unproblematic the point of 
view from which difference is seen, assigned, or ignored, rather than acknowledge that 
the problem of difference can be described and understood from multiple points of 
view.”42 More importantly, as Martha Minnow reminds us, the very existence of 
“multiple viewpoints challenges the assumption of objectivity and shows how claims to 
 
38 See Clarence Page, supra  (“as the misery mounted, more TV broadcasters mentioned what viewers could 
plainly see, that the vast majority of “refugees,” were black and poor.”);  See also, Anna Mulrine, supra 
(“Katrina’s lethal one-two punch of 145 mile-per-hour winds and 25-foot storm surge left 90,000 square 
miles of heartbreak, devastation, and unhinged lives…[it] uprooted more Americans than the Civil War, the 
Dust Bowl storms of the 1930’s or the San Francisco earthquake of 1906…this is our tsumani.”) 
39 Flagg, supra Was Blind, But Now I See at 987  
40 WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 35 (Brown, et. al. eds.) 
(University of California Press, 2003 [hereinafter Brown, Whitewashing Race] 
 
41 JOE FEAGIN & EILEEN O’BRIEN, WHITE MEN ON RACE: POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND THE 
SHAPING OF CULTURAL CONSCIOUSNESS, 17-18 (Beacon Press, 2003) [hereinafter Feagin, White 
Men on Race]   
42 Minow, Justice supra at 14 
14
knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims.”43 Therefore it is important to 
pay careful attention to the way in which the courts generally and the United States 
Supreme Court in particular, treat the issues of racial difference and racial perspective in 
the process of resolving racialized claims of constitutional rights.  
 The principal argument of this article is that in resolving competing racially 
inflected claims to constitutional shelter, the Supreme Court’s racial perspective “is 
unreflectively locked inside its own…limited…experience,”44 and as a consequence it 
has consistently chosen to view racial reality through a “totally white prism” and thus has 
adopted a distinctly white-centered perspective as the “master framework”45 or dominant 
judicial gaze46 through which it evaluates racial reality in America.47 Moreover, this 
article argues that the Court’s consistent choice of a white-centered perspective as the 
 
43 Id (“There is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are only the 
various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that their descriptions and 
theories subserve.”) (citing H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 50 (1981); See also, T. 
NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 7 (1986).   
44 WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 35 (Brown, et. al. eds.) 
(University of California Press, 2003 [hereinafter Brown, Whitewashing Race] (“any perspective that is 
unreflectively locked inside its own experience is limited, and this is particularly so when that perspective 
reflects the dominant culture.”) 
45 Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy supra (Although all the races in a racialized social system have the 
capacity to develop these frameworks, the frameworks of the dominant race become the master frameworks 
against which all racial actors compare (positively or negatively) their ideological positions.”) 
46 See CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE! AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 
CHRISTIANITY, (Westminster John Knox Press, (1982, 2002) [PROPHESY DELIVERANCE ] 49, 50, 
55  
The captivity of natural history to what I have called the “normative gaze” signifies the first stage of the 
emergence of the idea of white supremacy as an object of modern discourse.” …the idea of white 
supremacy emerges partly because of the powers within the structure of modern discourse—powers to 
produce and prohibit, develop and delimit, forms of rationality, scientificity, and objectivity which set 
perimeters and draw boundaries for the intelligibility, availability, and legitimacy of certain ideas.  …the 
controlling metaphors, notions, categories, and norms that shape the predominant conceptions of truth and 
knowledge in the modern West. 
 
But see, ANATOMY OF RACISM, supra (“the metaphors of racist discourse are not reducible to a single 
form.”)  
47 As a result, this unreflective judicial attitude has led the Court to consistently deny or ignore competing 
non-white-centered viewpoints as legitimate bases for either interpreting or articulating the nature and 
meaning of racial reality in America.    
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exclusive lens through which to resolve race based constitutional claims “cannot be 
defended as principled, coherent or neutral.”48 
The choice49 by America’s highest legal tribunal to adopt a white-centered 
perspective as its default lens for evaluating and resolving racially inflected constitutional 
claims is deeply troubling and problematic.  In making this choice, the Court has 
completely erased the non-white-centered perspective and not only allowed the white-
centered perspective to dominate its thinking, but also to present itself, not as the superior 
alternative among competing views of reality, but rather as an objective, unraced, and 
neutral judge of the real and the natural. 50 
This white-centered judicial gaze on America’s racial reality is problematic for 
both constitutional and policy reasons.  Specifically, this article argues that at minimum, 
from a constitutional perspective, whether the result of conscious or unconscious 
motivations,51 the Court’s consistent choice of a white-framed or white-centered 
perspective as the presumptive lens through which to understand and resolve 
constitutional race based claims, constitutes a constitutionally impermissible racial 
 
48 Geoffrey R. Stone, Rehnquist’s Legacy Doesn’t Measure Up, Chicago Tribune, September 6, 2005.  
(editorial following the sudden death of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist regarding the Justice’s views on in 
First Amendment cases that came before the Court during his tenure.) 
49 The choice of the white perspective is masked in the myth of the absence of choice.  However, whether it 
is made consciously or unconsciously, a choice is still certainly being made.   See also, Minnow, Justice 
supra at 70 (“There is no neutrality, no escape from choice. But it is possible to develop better abilities to 
name and grasp competing perspectives and to make more knowing choices…[which is] central to the 
challenge of engendering justice. ”) See also infra Section _____ regarding the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious choices.  
50 MATTHEW FRY JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRATION AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 10 (Harvard University Press, 1998) [hereinafter 
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color] (“[t]he awesome power of race as an ideology resides precisely 
in its ability to pass as a feature of the natural landscape.”).  
51 See Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has 
influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which these beliefs affect our actions.  In other words, 
a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious motivations.”);  
16
preference in favor of whiteness.52 Moreover, this article argues that this impermissible 
racial preference also represents a one-sided,53 arbitrary, unprincipled, irrational, 
capricious, and unexplained judicial choice in stark violation of the constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and of Due Process 
under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. This article also concludes that the 
Court’s consistent choice of a white-centered perspective to resolve race based 
constitutional claims is constitutionally indefensible and must be unambiguously rejected 
as the Court said in Loving v. Virginia, “as measures designed to maintain white 
supremacy.”54 
Moreover, more broadly, the Court’s choice of a controlling white-centered 
perspective is also deeply distressing because as Martha Minnow reminds us, in a 
pluristic society “[l]itigation in the Supreme Court should be an opportunity to endow 
rival vantages points with the reality that power enables, to redescribe and remake the 
meanings of difference in a world that has treated only some vantage points on difference 
as legitimate.”55 Instead of providing a forum where rival racial vantage points can be 
evaluated, measured, and can then compete for state recognition and support, the Court’s 
 
52 The central problem with white-centered perspective is that the Court mistakes this perspective for the 
real. It forgets that with respect to racial reality, the white-centered perspective is in dialectical and 
antinomic opposition to the non-white perspective, in that both are in fact in themselves quite reasonable 
given their respective starting points.  
 
53 See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 368 (1995) (accusing Patricia Williams in writing The 
Alchemy of Race and Rights, of  “suppress[ing] every perspective other than that of the suffering, 
oppressed black” and noting that “one-sidedness is an endemic risk of the literary depiction of reality, 
rather than a particular characteristic of Patricia Williams.”) (reprinted in EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN, 
ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE:  RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 20-21 (Foundation Press, 2005) 
54 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
55 Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 
16,  (1987-88) [hereinafter Minow, Justice]  
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adoption of the white-centered perspective erases all rival vantage points56 and crowns 
itself as the sole and undisputed interpreter of the nature and meaning of racial difference, 
that amounts to “a compulsory gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience.”57 
When the dominant ideology succeeds in controlling the Court’s interpretation 
and understanding of reality it is thereby able to control the production of what passes for 
knowledge.  Moreover, it is able to do so in a manner that “may even shape the terms of 
access for other points of view, so that exclusions appear natural, based on merit or on 
standards endorsed even by those who remain excluded.”58 
This article argues that the rhetorical narratives that the Court deploys to describe 
everything from the parties, circumstances, and operative legal standards, in judging race 
based claims to constitutional protection are more than mere neutral descriptors.  Instead 
because they are “determined within a social-cognitive matrix that is raced”59 they 
therefore constitute rhetorical tools in the classic sense,60 which are meant to construct a 
persuasive and particularized vision of racial reality. Moreover, they also “wrongly imply 
a natural fit with the world”61 and attempt to persuade that they lack particularity of 
perspective.   
 
56 See Id at 53, (“a judicial stance that treats its own perspective as unproblematic makes other perspectives 
invisible and puts them beyond discussion.”)  
57 ERIC STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA, 302 (1959) (quoting Fitzjames 
Stephen) 
58 Ideological success is achieved when only dissenting views are regarded as ideologies; the  
prevailing view is the truth. Those who win a given struggle for control have the best access to the 
means of producing knowledge, such as the mass media and schools.  …Historians have described 
how a conception of reality, when it triumphs, convinces even those injured by it of its actuality.  
Accordingly, political and cultural success itself submerges the fact that conceptions of reality 
represent a perspective of some groups, not a picture of reality free from any perspective. 
 
Minow, Justice supra at 67 
59 GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 73 (Harvard University Press, 
2002) [hereinafter Loury, Anatomy] 
60 Cornel Rhetoric etc.  
61 Minow, Justice supra at 14 
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A central analytical support beam in the Court’s rationalization of the white-
centered-perspective is it’s use of the rhetoric of white innocence and its underlying 
ideological scaffolding.62 For this reason, interrogating the meaning, significance, and 
implications of the Court’s adoption of the white-centered perspective as its unstated and 
exclusive measure of racial difference requires an interrogation of the relationship 
between the ideology of white innocence and the dialectic of whiteness in the formation 
of white identity. 63 
This article examines the rhetoric of white innocence through two illustrative 
examples in the law; first affirmative action, and second the Fourth Amendment.  In the 
case of affirmative action, this article will examine the Supreme Court’s use of the 
rhetoric of white innocence as a substantive counterweight by which the constitutionality 
of race conscious programs that benefit non-whites is measured.  In the context of the 
Fourth Amendment, this article will examine the Supreme Court’s use of the rhetoric of 
white innocence and thereby racializing the constitutional content of the reasonable 
person test in citizen police encounters.  
This interrogation is divided into six sections.  Section one examines the content of the 
ideology of white innocence.  Section two discusses the ideology of white innocence and 
 
62 See Id (describing ideology as “something at once so think and so vaporous.”); See also, KARL 
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 36 (L. Wirth & E. Shils trans. 1936): 
 
The concept of ‘ideology’ reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that 
ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply 
no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination.  There is implicit in 
the word ‘ideology’ that insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups 
obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it. 
 
63 See, Amanda E. Lewis, Some Are More Equal than Others: Lessons on Whiteness from School, in 
WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM 165 (Ashley W. Doane and Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva, eds.) (Routledge, 2003) [hereinafter Lewis, Lessons on Whiteness] (“it is particularly 
important to understand the parameters and functions of whiteness, [and] of what it means to say someone 
is white.”)  
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affirmative action by looking at the Court’s deployment of this ideology as a counterbalance with 
which to measure the constitutionality of race conscious affirmative action programs.  Section 
Three considers the Court’s use of the ideology of white innocence in mediating the content of 
the reasonable person test under the Fourth Amendment. Section Four examines some specific 
constitutional concerns with white innocence. Section Five offers a number of recommendations 
to disrupt the hegemonic grip of the Court’s rhetorical narrative of white innocence and supplant 
it with a constitutional racial analytic that appreciates a wider variety of legitimate racial vantage 
points or perspectives and thus a greater sense of racial reality in America and its relations with 
the rest of the world community of non-white peoples.  Section six offers a few concluding 




I.  The Ideology of White Innocence 
In any analysis which critiques an important facet of whiteness it is important to 
keep in mind the critical admonition articulated by historian David Roediger, that 
whiteness is not merely a color, it is also ”an ideology” that was “developed out of 
desires to rule and the exigencies of ruling.”64 This article argues that critical to this 
ideology of whiteness are notions of white innocence that are sufficiently discrete to 
constitute an independent, but also simultaneously interdependent ideology.65 Thus, the 
ideology of white innocence is derivative from the ideology of whiteness and like 
whiteness itself, it is “a peculiar institution,”66 that is a deeply schizophrenic and 
 
64 DAVID R. ROEDIGER, COLORED WHITE: TRANSCENDING THE RACIAL PAST, (University of 
California Press, 2002) 23 (“Perhaps the overarching theme in scholarship on whiteness is the argument 
that white identity is decisively shaped by the exercise of power and the expectation of advantages in 
acquiring property.”). See also, Lipsitz, Possessive Investment in Whiteness at viii (“I hope it is clear that 
opposing whiteness is not the same as opposing white people.  White supremacy is an equal opportunity 
employer; nonwhite people can become active agents of white supremacy as well as passive participants in 
its hierarchies and rewards.”) 
65 See, Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy supra:  
 
[i]deology consists of the broad mental and moral frameworks, or grids, that social groups use to 
make sense of the world, to decide what is right and wrong, true or false, important or 
unimportant.  Although ideologies do not provide individuals, as group members, with an explicit 
road map of how to act, what to believe and what to say, they furnish the basis principles 
individuals use to sift through contested and often contradictory information in order to make 
sense of social reality. …Ideologies are about meanings that express relations of domination. 
 
See also, Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 
23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988) (“Central to my new array of insights was that law and rights 
might be better understood not as functional, responsive and autonomous expressions of shared values or 
emerging egalitarian norms, but instead as ideology.”); See also, Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy supra at 
63 (“a more fruitful approach for examining individual racial views is the notion of racial ideology, or the 
racially based frameworks used by actors to explain and justify (dominant race) or challenge (subordinate 
race) the racial status quo.”). 
 
66 Id at 137; See also, THEODORE ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE VOL. I, 1 
(19___) 
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inconsistent mix of both color blind and color conscious values, understandings, and 
perspectives.67 
Under the ideology of white innocence as conceived by this article there are four 
principle ways in which whiteness reflects and reinscribes notions of innocence. First, 
whiteness is regarded as innocent of race itself.  Second, whiteness is considered to be 
innocent of racial perspective.  Third, whiteness insists that it is innocent of racism.  
Fourth, whiteness argues that it is innocent of racial benefit from the legacy of American 
racism.  
 
A.  The Innocence of Whiteness 
As used in this article, whiteness can be understood as a “privileged strategic 
location in a racialized social system…[whose] views, fears, and rationalizations take a 
central position in the overall “ideological ensemble” of a society.”68 From this central 
position in society, the essential principles of the ideology of white innocence strongly 
correlate with what has variously been described as a “new racism,”69 or a “neo-con or 
 
67 See, MATTHEW FRY JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRATION AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE, 5 (Harvard University Press, 1998) [hereinafter 
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color] (“The contest over whiteness – its definition, its internal 
hierarchies, its proper boundaries, and its rightful claimants—has been critical to American culture 
throughout the nation’s history, and it has been a fairly untidy affair.”)  
68 EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL 
RIGHTS ERA, 62 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) [hereinafter Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy] (noting 
that the “ideological ensemble of a society” consists of “racial, class, and other forms of hierarchical 
structurations…[and that] the focus [here is] exclusively on the racial aspects of the ideological ensemble.”) 
id at 83 nt. 16.   
69 Paul Finkelman, The Rise of the New Racism 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245 (1996) [hereinafter 
Finkelman, the New Racism] (describing the new racism as “a way of thinking that has become fashionable 
and acceptable in some quarters [that] (1) denies the history of racial oppression in America; (2) rejects 
biological racism in favor of an attack on black culture; and (3) supports formal, de jure equality.”) id at 
247. 
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neo-confederate”70 racism, or a new “conservative racial realism.”71 For this reason, the 
ideology of white innocence may either be deployed innocently out of ignorance or 
strategically out of political calculation.72 
Moreover, the essential principles of white innocence also strongly correlate with 
the various major dictionary definitions of the term “innocence” generally. As a baseline 
to interpret the Court’s use of the term “innocence” it is important to note that there are 
four general definitions of the term innocence from which to choose.  First, the term 
innocence is primarily defined “in a narrow, even technical way”73 as simply the ‘absence 
of guilt’ in the commission of a crime or offense.74 This is the primary, narrowest, and 
most technical definition of the term innocence.75 It connotes a highly legalistic sense of 
having been wrongly accused or adjudicated as guilty of some specifically charged crime 
or offense.  Second, “innocence can also take on a larger meaning that extends beyond 
technicality into morality: freedom from sin, guilt, or moral wrong in general; the state of 
 
70 PETER APPLEBOME, DIXIE RISING: HOW THE SOUTH IS SHAPING AMERICAN VALUES, 
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 136 (Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996)  
71 WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 1 (Brown, et. al. eds.) 
(University of California Press, 2003) 6 [hereinafter Brown, Whitewashing Race] (describing the new 
“racial realists” central organizing claims as consisting of:   
 
three related claims: First, …racism is a thing of the past…the economic divide between whites and 
blacks…is exaggerated, and white Americans have been receptive to demands for racial equality. [Their] 
second claim is that persistent racial inequalities…cannot be explained by white racism. As they see it, the 
problem is the lethargic, incorrigible, and often pathological behavior of people who fail to take 
responsibility for their own lives, [and are] …attributable to the moral and cultural failure of African 
Americans, not to discrimination. [Third], the civil rights movement’s political failures are caused by the 
manipulative, expedient behavior of black nationalists and the civil rights establishment.  
 
72 See Finkelman, supra New Racism  
73 Harris, Innocence and the Soprano’s, supra at 577 (“freedom from specific guilt; the fact of not being 
guilty of that which one is charged; guiltless.”) 
74 The New Oxford American Dictionary at 875.  [hereinafter, Oxford]The sense of innocence as being not 
guilty or wrongfully accused is poignantly illustrated in the recent popularity of “innocence projects” which 
have created all over the country.      
75 Id 
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being untainted with, or unacquainted with, evil; moral purity,”76 or of being ‘free of 
responsibility’ or moral blameworthiness for something, yet nonetheless “suffering its 
consequences.”77 The third alternative definition of innocence is understood to describe 
those who are naïve, unaware, uninitiated, weak or vulnerable.78 
As one scholar has observed, there is a fourth alternative definition of innocence 
that, “conveys a larger idea that is more powerful and evocative than the former’s narrow 
literalism.”79 In this larger and more expansive view, innocence “evokes the sleeping 
infant, wholly dependant and pure of thought and deed. No avoidable harm can be 
justifiably inflicted on this type of innocent.”80 In fact, this type of innocence imposes 
“moral…demands” on others to “receive care and protection from harm.”81 Thus this 
expansive moral dimension of innocence “is not a passive state” but rather “includes the 
power to command others to action – that is, to require the care and protection of those 
deemed innocent.”82 
1. Innocent of Race 
Despite the overwhelming rejection by the scientific and academic community of 
the notion of biological racial essentialism83 and the widespread acceptance of race as 
 
76 Harris, Innocence and the Soprano’s, supra at 577 (citing the Oxford English Dictionary 995 (2d ed. 
1989) (“It bestows no special legal status. Yet, it is a positive attribute with normative consequences.”)id.  
77Oxford, supra.   
78 Id 
79 Seth D. Harris, Innocence and the Sopranos, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577, 577 (2004-5) 
80 Id  
81 Id. 
82 Id. (noting that this expansive form of innocence leads the Court to “afford…almost parental care and 
protection appropriate only for the sleeping infant who exemplifies the broader, moral definition of 
innocence.”) id at 580 
83 See, Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 (defining racial essentialism “as the assumption that social 
differences such as those between men and women, people of different races, or social classes are due to 
intrinsic biological or psychic differences…[that] are believed to be innate and unchanging.”) 
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nothing more than a social construct,84 from a white-centered perspective the ideology of 
white innocence reflects a continuing sense of real, socially meaningful, essential, and 
biological differences between differently raced peoples.  As one scholar has noted, the 
white-centered perspective tends “to think of race as being indisputable, real.  It frames 
our notions of kinship and descent and influences our movements in the social world; we 
see it plainly on one another’s faces.  From this perspective race somehow still seems to 
be a product not of the social imagination but of biology.”85 
This biological view of race has been advanced and perpetuated in one form or 
another for the last one hundred and fifty years,86 under the banner of scientific racism.87 
This so-called scientific school of thought argued that “each race had an essence 
distinguishing it from other races and accounting for its inferiority or superiority,”88 
and has a tragic and bloody history.  This view provided the foundation not only for Jim 
Crow segregation,89 lynching,90 and profound white violence in America,91 but also 
 
84 cite 
85 Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color supra at 1  
86 See id, supra (“Since the eighteenth century, racist beliefs have been built upon scientific racial 
categorizations and the linking of social and cultural traits to supposed genetic racial difference.”) 
87 See, Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 (“The history of racial categorizations is intertwined with the 
history of racism.  Science sought to justify a priori racist assumptions and consequently rationalized and 
greatly expanded the arsenal of racist ideology.”) 
88 Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 (noting that this view “molded both scientific and popular 
conceptions of race from Reconstruction until World War I, giving rise to social Darwinism and 
eugenics…[which] argued, conveniently, that natural selection was at work in the social world and that 
success was dependant upon one’s fitness.”) id at 32 
89 See id, supra at 33 (“The entire Jim Crow system of discrimination and strict segregation was supported 
by widespread, commonly held scientific assumptions about the permanence of racial essences, the extent 
to which race determines social and cultural behavior, and the danger of miscegenation.”) 
90 See, GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN 
THE SOUTH, 1890-1940, 199 et seq.  (Pantheon Books, 1998)  [hereinafter Hale, Making Whiteness] 
(describing the rapid rise and enormous and widespread popularity of spectacle lynching in the South) ; See 
also, LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 
(Knopf, New York, 1999) 280 et. seq. (describing the extreme savagery, barbarity, violence, and popularity 
of spectacle lynchings.  For example, “But the crowd had not finished.  Throwing the body into a fire, they 
watched with astonishing coolness and nonchalance as it burned.  Finally, the relic hunters moved in to 
retrieve portions of the rope and what was left of the charred body.”) (citing Ida B. Wells, Lynch Law, in 
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furnished the intellectual justification for the infamous genocidal “sterilization and 
extermination policies in the name of racial purification,”92 pursued by Nazi Germany 
that claimed the lives of six million Jews, 93 at least as many racially undesirable others, 
and plunged the globe into its second world war of almost unimaginable carnage.  
However, despite this infamous pedigree, notions of scientific racism have exhibited a 
remarkable “staying power [as]… attested to [by] the recent publication of the Bell 
Curve,”94 and its widespread popularity.  However, from the non-white-centered 
perspective “[w]hile the history of the scientific concept of race argues that race is an 
inherent essence, it reveals, on the contrary, that race is a social construct.”95 The deep-
seated white-centered notion of racial essentialism “cannot be supported” because “while 
our commonsense assumptions may tell us that race is rooted in biology, biologists today 
reject such notions.”96 
i. Personal White Identity 
 
THE REASON WHY THE COLORED AMERICAN IS NOT IN THE WORLDS COLUMBIAN 
EXPOSITION, AT 30-33)   
91 See, HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY, 10 (University of Massachusetts Press, 1988) [hereinafter 
Shapiro, White Violence] (noting the widespread violence, murder and arson committed by whites on 
blacks during Reconstruction. “Violence and…the threat of violence…blocked access to education, denied 
entrance to trades, or prevented land ownership undermined black efforts to realize the American 
Dream…[the] three avenues …most commonly traveled by other Americans in their quest for self 
advancement.”) 
92 Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33. 
93 See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY 
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (Vintage Books, 1996); See also, GITTA SERENY, INTO THAT 
DARKNESS: AN EXAMINATION OF CONSCIENCE, (Vintage Books, 1974). 
94 Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 
95 Id  
96 Id at 19 (“Racial categories lack any scientific foundation; there is greater genetic variety within racial 
groups than between them, and racial classifications vary both cross-culturally and historically.”) 
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Moreover, the claim of whiteness as a form of personal identity97 is a relatively 
recent historical phenomenon98 and is heavily “veiled in value.”99 This notion of a 
personal white identity is also a uniquely Western100 conflation of diverse European 
national ethnicities into a relatively recent, and socially constructed race based claim of 
group identity.101 Additionally, this is not a positive claim about what one is, but rather a 
claim grounded in negation based on what one is not.102 This is because to claim to be 
 
97 See West, supra West Reader at 501 (“Identity has to do with protection, association and recognition.  
People identify themselves in certain ways in order to protect their bodies, their labor, their communities, 
their way of life; in order to be associated with people who ascribe value to them, who take them seriously, 
who respect them; and for purposes of recognition, to be acknowledged, to feel as if one actually belongs to 
a group.”) 
98 Cite  
99 David Theo Goldberg, The Social Formation of Racist Discourse, in ANATOMY OF RACISM, (David 
Theo Goldberg, ed.) 301 (University of Minnesota Press, 1990) (“The seemingly naked body of pure facts 
is veiled in value.”) 
100 See RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTUCTION 
OF WHITENESS, 265 nt. 2 (University of Minnesota Press, 1993) (“West and Western are relational terms 
constructed out of opposition to non-Western Others or Orientals.  Westerness implies a particular, 
dominative relationship to power, colonial expansion, a belonging to center rather than margin in a global 
capitalist system, and a privileged relationship to institutions…for the production of knowledge.”) 
101 See Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 (While the history of the scientific concept of race argues 
that race is an inherent essence, it reveals, on the contrary, that race is a social construct.”); See also, West, 
supra West Reader at 503.  In a chapter entitled “On Black – Brown Relations” in a conversation between 
Cornel West and Jorge Klor de Alva, Professor de Alva observes that: 
 
We have in the United States, two mechanisms at play in the construction of collective identities. One is to 
identify folks from a cultural perspective.  The other is to identify them from a racial perspective.  Now, 
with the exception of black-white relations, the racial perspective is not the critical one for most folks. The 
cultural perspective was, at one time, very sharply drawn, including the religious line between Catholics 
and Protestants, Jews and Protestants, Jews and Catholics, Jews and Christians.  But in the twentieth 
century, we have seen in the United States a phenomenon that we do not see anyplace else in the world – 
the capacity to blur the differences between these cultural groups, to construct them in such a way that they 
become insignificant and to fuse them into a new group called whites, which didn’t exist before. 
 
(Cornel West responds by noting that “part of the tragedy of American civilization is precisely the degree 
to which the stability and continuity of American democracy has been predicated on a construct of 
whiteness that includes the subordination of black people, so that European cultural diversity could 
disappear into American whiteness while black folk remain subordinated.”) id. 
 
102 See, Tayyab Mahmud, Class in LatCrit: Theory and Praxis in a World of Economic Inequality (LatCrit 
V Symposium) 78 UNIV. DENVER L.REV. 657, 661 (2001): 
 
modern universality rests upon a conceptual partitioning and corresponding transformation of human 
populations into a divide between, as Jean-Paul Sartre put it, “men” and “natives.” The canonical dark-
skinned savage, constituted as the not-quite-human Other, furnished the grounds to constitute the universal 
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white necessarily implies a claim of racial purity.103 It is effectively a claim104 of being 
free from even “one drop” of black or African blood in one’s ancestral chain of racial 
title.105 In short, a claim of personal whiteness is tantamount to a claim of being innocent 
of blackness.  
 
subject of modernity, i.e. the civilized rights-bearing European. In this maneuver, one can see in operation 
ostensive self-definition by negation, the assumption of identity by reference to what one is not.  
 
(citing Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 38, (Grove 
Press, 1963).  See also, V.G. KIERNANA, THE LORDS OF HUMAN KIND: BLACK MAN, YELLOW 
MAN, AND WHITE MAN IN AN AGE OF EMPIRE (1969)  
 
103 See ABBY L. FERBER, WHITE MAN FALLING: RACE, GENDER, AND WHITE SUPREMACY, 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998) 34, 33 (“From the moment the concept of race was invented, 
interracial sexuality became a concern.  Historically, the preoccupation with defining who is white and who 
is black superseded concern with defining other nonwhites. The history of slavery and Jim Crow 
segregation depended upon firm knowledge of who was white and black for their support…the project of 
defining races always involves drawing and maintaining boundaries between the races.”); See also id 
(Regarding the “tragedy of miscegenation…Every form of political and economic equality for blacks was 
depicted as a threat to white racial purity, responded to with fears of interracial sexuality, and argued 
against on that basis.”) id at 41.  
104 Such contemporary claims, although common among those who consider themselves to be white, are 
inherently unprovable beyond more than two or three generations in the vast majority of cases. Thus at 
best, in many such cases these claims rest on little more than a mere hunch, a hope, and a prayer based on 
the perceived white physical characteristics of only a few generations.   
105 See Ferber, White Man Falling supra at 23 (“the historical construction of the opposition white/black 
involves defining the limits of whiteness and blackness and defining precisely who qualifies as white and 
who qualifies as black.  In order to produce whiteness a stable, natural, given identity, the boundaries of 
whiteness must be specified and secured.”) also at23,  35(“In order to racially classify the population…laws 
label[ed] the fraction of black blood necessary to deem an individual black. …Increasingly, states moved 
even further toward the one-drop rule, which defined as black all those with one discernable drop of black 
blood.”); See also, id at 43 (“While a great deal has changed over the past three decades, the one drop rule 
is still generally accepted, and interracial unions remain controversial and uncommon.”);  See also, id at 41 
(noting that interracial black/white marriages are still relatively rare “While the rate of black-white 
intermarriage increased 63 percent between 1960-1970, such marriages consistently represent only 1 to 2 
percent of all marriages.”)   See also West, supra West Reader at 501 (“In the United States this 
unwillingness to challenge what has come to be known as the one-drop rule—wherein anyone who ever 
had an African ancestor, however remote, is identifiable only as black—has…trap[ped]…so-called people 
of color, in a social basement with no exit ladders.”).  See also, STEPHEN THERNSTROM AND 
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 
(Simon and Schuster, 1997) (“It is startling that until 1989 our birth registration rules provided that the 
child of a white husband and a black wife counted as “black,” and so, too, did the child of a black husband 
and a white wife. It was the “one drop of blood” rule: a trace of black blood and you were black.”); and 
Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in Race-Conscious Law, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994) Noting that: 
 
From 1950 to 1989, …the federal guidelines…used in making birth certificate race-identification records 
[were] outlined …by …the National Center for Health Statistics…included a procedure for determining the 
race of a child from the self-reported race of the parents.  In the case of mixed parentage where only one 
parent was white, the child was assigned to the other parent’s race. When neither parent was white, the 
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Because by definition claims of personal whiteness necessarily invoke claims of 
purity they therefore require constant attention to “policing the borders [and] 
maintenance of the boundaries between one’s own kind and others.”106 This is true 
because, as Iris Marion Young has observed, “any move to define an identity, a closed 
totality, always depends on excluding some elements, separating the pure from the 
impure…the logic of identity seeks to keep those borders firmly drawn.”107 The thrust of 
this “boundary maintenance”108 has taken the form of legal and social prohibitions 
designed to suppress “interracial sexuality and the births of mulattoes” because this 
“represented boundary crossings that were widely perceived as threatening otherwise 
stable racial boundaries.”109 
Thus, a claim of personal whiteness is not only paradoxically a claim of being 
“pure” or uncontaminated by blackness, but also of actually transcending race or being 
innocent of race itself.  However, this transcendence notwithstanding, most people who 
regard themselves as white,110 are deeply invested in their whiteness, because it is “an 
identity that provides them with resources, power, and opportunity.”111 However, 
 
child was assigned to the race of the father. One notable characteristic is that any coupling between Whites 
and non-Whites was deemed to produce non-White children.  White racial status could only be removed by 
inter-group parentage, never gained.  
 
106 Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 23 
107 Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMINISM/ 
POSTMODERNISM 303 (Linda J. Nicholson, ed) (Routledge, 1990) 
108 Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 23 
109 Id 
110 DAVID R. ROEDIGER, COLORED WHITE: TRANSCENDING THE RACIAL PAST, 124 
(University of California Press, 2002) (noting that “a substantial African American tradition [exists] that 
regards terror and complicity in terror as the glue binding together those who think that they are white.”) 
111 GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE 
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS, 1 (Temple University Press, 1998) [hereinafter Lipsitz, Possessive 
Investment in Whiteness] at vii (“this whiteness is, of course, a delusion, a scientific and cultural fiction 
that like all racial identities has no valid foundation in biology or anthropology.  Whiteness is, however, as 
social fact, an identity created and continued with all-too-real consequences for the distribution of wealth, 
prestige, and opportunity.”) id. 
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despite this investment, they are also simultaneously schizophrenically deeply in denial 
regarding the racially contingent basis of their identity.  This is especially true because, 
just as men have difficulty imagining themselves “as having gendered identities,”112 
many whites have similar difficulty seeing themselves as raced and thus having racial 
identities in American society.   
Thus, most whites are conditioned not to view themselves in racial terms; instead 
they believe that “race is something that doesn’t affect whites.”113 Under this logic, race 
is something that affects racial minorities like blacks, Latinos, Asians, or American 
Indians, but not whites.114 Thus whiteness and its attendant privileges is something that 
members of the “dominant group [are] taught not to see.”115 As a result, even though 
whites “enjoy unearned skin privilege” merely from being identified in society as 
white,116 they “have been conditioned into oblivion about its existence [and are] unable to 
see that it puts [them] ahead in any way… overrewarding… and yet also paradoxically 
damaging [them.]”117 As Richard Dyer has poignantly observed “[a]s long as race is 
something only applied to non-white peoples, as long as white people are not racially 
seen and named, they/we function as a human norm.  Other people are raced, we are just 
people.”118 
112 McIntosh, White Privilege supra at 296 
113 MELANIE E. L. BUSH, BREAKING THE CODE OF GOOD INTENTIONS: EVERYDAY FORMS 
OF WHITENESS, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004) 
114 Lewis, Lessons on Whiteness, supra at 165 (noting that most whites do “not have a coherent or self-
conscious identity as a white person.  As far as [they are] concerned, race was about others.”); See also, id 
at 161 (“many whites do not necessarily recognize their own status as a racial actors or consciously identify 
as belonging to a racial group.”) 
115 Id at 292 
116 See Plessy v. Ferguson, (discussing the value of a reputation for being white) 
117 Id at 292; See also Anthony Farley… 
118 RICHARD DYER, WHITE 1 (Routledge, 1997) (“to say that one is interested in race has come to mean 
that one is interested in any racial imagery other than that of white people.  Yet race is not only attributable 
to people who are not white.”) 
30
As a consequence of whites not seeing themselves as being raced within Western 
culture, as standing for the “human norm,” they are thereby able to “claim to speak for 
the commonality of humanity.”119 The claim of whiteness to speak for all of humanity is 
sui generis because “raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race.  But 
non-raced people can, for they do not represent the interest of a race.”120 Whiteness is 
thus thought of as coterminous with being “just human…[or] just people…which is not 
far off saying that whites are people whereas other colours are something else…[and] is 
endemic to white culture.”121 Because most whites see themselves as just people without 
a conscious racial identity, this gives rise to a sense of being innocent of race that is 
uncomfortably disturbed when they are reminded that they are white.  As Dyer points out, 
“bell hooks, for instance, has noted how amazed and angry white liberals become when 
attention is drawn to their whiteness, when they are seen by non-white people as 
white.”122 
ii. White is a Color Too 
Despite white denials of being an unraced norm, the hard truth is that they are 
clearly raced within Western culture because “everyone in this social order has been 
constructed in our political imagination as a racialised subject.”123 Thus in order to 
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disrupt the hegemony of whiteness,124 it is necessary to “see” it as a racialised socially 
constructed identity and to “make visible…the invisibility of whiteness as a racial 
position in white (which is to say dominant) discourse.”125 In the absence of such 
disruption, the “racial position” of whiteness will continue to be “the white point in space 
from which we tend to identify difference,”126 or the “vantage point”127 from which all 
things are judged and measured.   
 As Richard Dyer reminds us, “indeed, to say that one is interested in race has come to 
mean that one is interested in any racial imagery other than that of white people.  Yet race is not 
only attributable to people who are not white, nor is imagery of non-white people the only racial 
imagery.”128 Non-whites are not the only people who are raced in American culture.  White is a 
color too, although it has become so ubiquitous that it has become invisible.  Thus Dyer argues 
that, “everyone in this social order has been constructed in our political imagination as a 
racialized subject and thus…we should consider whiteness as well as blackness,” as racialized 
colors “in order to make visible what is rendered invisible when viewed as the normative state of 
existence: the white point in space from which we tend to identify difference.”129 
The power of “the invisibility of whiteness as a racial position in white (that is to say 
dominant) discourse is of a piece with its ubiquity” and allows whites to be seen as not as raced 
peoples, but rather as just as people outside of a socially raced perspective or as “the norm, the 
ordinary, the standard…[but] precisely because of …their placing as norm they seem not be 
represented to themselves as whites but as people who are variously gendered, classed, 
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sexualized and abled.”  Dyer thus concludes that “at the level of racial representation…whites 
are not of a certain race, they’re just the human race…and speak for humanity”130 Moreover, “as 
long as whiteness is felt to be the human condition, then it alone both defines normality and fully 
inhabits it.”131 
2.  Innocent of Racial Perspective  
Since most whites “do not conceive of themselves in racialized terms” they 
consider their perspective to be an equally unraced and objective report of reality, 
especially racial reality.  Moreover, since whiteness sees itself as the norm, logically non-
whites “are defined as deviating from the norm.”132 Thus whiteness sees itself as the real 
and non-whites as somehow not real or certainly less real. Under this logic, since whites 
are the only “real” people, it follows that their perceptions of racial reality are the only 
real ones real as well.   
Since most whites are paradoxically simultaneously both keenly aware of their 
whiteness, and deeply oblivious to it, they see their whiteness not as a raced condition but 
as the norm.  As Peggy McIntosh reminds us, “whites are taught to think of themselves as 
morally neutral; normative, and average, and also ideal.”133 Similarly Richard Dyer 
concludes that “[f]or those in power in the West, as long as whiteness is felt to be the 
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human condition, then it alone both defines normality and fully inhabits it” and in this 
way “secures a position of power.”134 
This socially constructed racial identity of being real, forms what Peggy McIntosh 
has described as “a base of unacknowledged …unearned…skin privilege” which she 
describes as being “like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, 
assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visa, clothes, compass, emergency 
gear, and blank checks.”135 Because these privileges of whiteness are unspoken they are 
invisible,136 but nonetheless palpably clear and real and constitutive of a racially and 
“arbitrarily conferred dominance.”137 However, both whiteness and the ideology of white 
innocence are in plain sight while also simultaneously totally invisible. This paradoxical 
racial phenomenon is not new. As George Lipsitz reminds us, “whiteness is everywhere 
in U.S. culture, but it is very hard to see.”138 This is because, “white power secures its 
dominance by seeming not to be anything in particular. As the unmarked category against 
which difference is constructed, whiteness never has to speak its name, never has to 
acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and cultural relations.” 139 
134 DYER, WHITE supra at 9 (“ White people have power and believe that they think, feel and act like and 
for all people; white people unable to see their particularity, cannot take account of other people’s.”) 
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This seeming invisibility of whiteness allows the Court to deploy the rhetorical 
narrative of white innocence as a kind of “semantic code”140 that supplies a moral armor 
thorough which the Court can appear to measure constitutionality under what seem to be 
praiseworthy and ostensibly racially neutral standards, but which are in reality, deeply 
racialized.  This is true because not only does the analysis proceed exclusively from the 
white vantage point, but the standards the Court adopts also serve to protect, perpetuate, 
and rationalize the existing extreme disequilibrium of power, wealth, and access to the 
good things in life under the racial status quo.141 Thus, white innocence constitutes a 
type of magic amulet contained in McIntosh’s “invisible weightless knapsack”142 of 
white privilege, with which whites can ward off the dark forces of responsibility for the 
creation, and perpetuation, of the many inequalities, burdens, and benefits of the racial 
status quo in contemporary America.   
Thus, through this rhetorical narrative, the presumption of white racial innocence 
constitutes an important, obvious, but also, an effectively hidden pillar of the racial status 
quo that Cass Sunstein calls “the baseline for assessing neutrality.”143 From this 
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perspective any disturbance in the existing racial prerogatives, preferences, and 
advantages of so-called innocent whites as a group, is regarded as a “departure from the 
status quo” and thus “signals partisanship” while “respect for [this] status quo signals 
neutrality.”144 As a result, the white-centered perspective is able to claim that it does not 
have a racial vantage point, and in so doing continues to “perpetuate the mythology of the 
neutral observer.”145 
Similar to Sunstein’s observations, Martha Minow observes that the “unstated 
assumption” of a white racialized standpoint of the status quo can “so entrench one point 
of view as natural and orderly that any conscious decision to notice or to ignore 
difference breaks the illusion of a legal world free of perspective.”146 Like Sunstein, 
Minow also argues that these unstated and deeply racialized assumptions “make it seem 
that departures from unstated norms violate commitments to neutrality.  Yet adhering to 
the unstated norms undermines commitments to neutrality – and to equality.”147 
But of course, the hard truth is that whiteness is not a racially neutral lens 
thorough which to gaze at the world of racial reality.  Instead, whiteness has a distinct 
racialized “standpoint [or] location from which to see [itself] others, and national and 
global others.”148 Failing to acknowledge the “unstated assumption” of this white 
standpoint, or the “white point in space” that constitutes the source of the white vantage 
point, has highly negative consequences. As Martha Minow has observed, “[v]eiling the 
standpoint of the observer conceals its impact on our perception of the world…[and] 
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leads to the next unstated assumption: that all other perspectives are either presumptively 
identical to the observer’s own or are irrelevant.”149 This is particularly important in the 
context of the judicial function because, as Minow goes on to explain, “a judicial stance 
that treats its own perspective as unproblematic makes other perspectives invisible and 
puts them beyond discussion.”150 
3.  Innocent of Racism 
From the white-centered perspective, racism in America is considered to be such 
an artifact of America’s ancient past that it has moved one commentator, speaking from 
that vantage point to claim that “the blood of slavery does not stain modern mainstream 
America.”151 Thus freed from the “stain” of slavery, some scholars have argued that 
white racial attitudes in America have improved and “transformed” so dramatically that 
although “[w]hites with a pathological hatred of African Americans can still be 
found…the haters have become a tiny remnant with no influence in any important sphere 
of American life.”152 As a result, a significant theme among scholars who speak from a 
white-centered-perspective is the conclusion that, “at least when it comes to questions of 
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public policy, few whites are now racists.”153 From this perspective most whites are no 
longer guilty of racism, thus with the exception of a few fringe outliers they – and thus 
whiteness itself --  must also logically therefore be considered innocent of racism. 
 
i. A Discredited View of Racism 
From this perspective the continuing presence of “racial incidents demonstrate” 
not the presence of societal racism but rather simply confirms that a few isolated “bigots 
and institutional failures still exist; however, they do not indicate that racism is a 
systemic problem.”154 Significantly this view of the innocence of whiteness is only 
possible through the filtering of “evidence and …judgment through an outdated, 
discredited understanding of racism.”  This discredited view is premised on the 
assumption that racism in contemporary America consists of acts which are “intentional, 
obvious and individual.”155 This view is based on “a particular understanding of 
racism…[that] assumes that racism is motivated, crude, explicitly supremacist and 
typically expressed as individual bias.  Moreover, this view regards racism to be the 
result of intentional individual behavior that is both conscious and knowing in order to 
satisfy a personal racial animus and taste for discrimination that are manifested by either 
formal or explicit barriers to access based on racial categorization.  This view ignores the 
fact that “white supremacy is usually less a matter of direct, referential, and snarling 
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contempt than a system for protecting the privileges of whites by denying communities of 
color opportunities for asset accumulation and upward mobility.”156 
ii. The End of Racism 
Through the white-centered perspective, a great many whites and non-whites have 
adopted a form of American color blindness that holds that “except for vestigial pockets 
of historical racism, any possible connection between past racial subordination and the 
present situation has been severed by the formal repudiation of old race-conscious 
policies.”157 These modern “apostles” in the faith of colorblindness thus advocate a 
perspective on race that “insists that racism is primarily a thing of the past.”158 
Thus, “those who adhere to this color-blind view typically assume that racial 
discrimination is much less frequent today and what remains is basically a problem of a 
few bigoted individuals and not of social institutions.”159 From this white-centered 
vantage point, white innocence defines racism as primarily consisting of individual acts 
by rogue whites exiting on the fringe of mainstream society.160 Thus central to the 
ideology of white innocence is the notion that with the exception of this “tiny 
minority…of racist hotheads…who occupy political space only on the fringes of 
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mainstream white America…racism has been eradicated” by the actions of civil rights 
laws that stuck down “legal segregation and outlaw[ed] discrimination.”161 
The elimination of these formal barriers to racial equality has spawned a cult of 
“color blindness” in which the presumed “race neutrality of the legal system creates the 
illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for the condition of the 
Black underclass.”162 Instead, the continuance of racial equality is no longer blamed on 
the biological racial inferiority of non-whites but rather on their cultural inferiority.163 
Although as George Fredrickson reminds us, “culture can be reified and essentialized to 
the point where it has the same deterministic effect as skin color.”164 
Similarly, not only do most whites consider themselves to be personally innocent 
of racism, but in national terms recent surveys reveal that “a majority of whites indicate 
that they do not see U.S. society as fundamentally racist or still pervaded by widespread 
discrimination.”165 In fact, “from this perspective, many whites believe that the 1960’s 
civil rights laws took care of most serious racial discrimination…[and] the majority of 
whites see the U.S. social system as fair and egalitarian, and some get angry that black 
Americans do not see the country in the same way.”166 Thus, “a majority of whites 
indicate in surveys that they sincerely believe that racial discrimination is no longer a 
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serious problem for black Americans.”167 Not only to most whites think that racial 
discrimination against blacks is largely a thing of the past, “[e]ven more striking, perhaps 
is the fact that a majority of whites do not see the centuries of slavery and segregation as 
bringing whites substantial socioeconomic benefits.”168 
This white-centered view of the nature of racism reflects what Alan Freeman has 
characterized as a move from a “victim perspective” to a “perpetrator perspective”169 As 
the labels imply, the victim perspective was focused on the injury or loss suffered by the 
victims of racial discrimination.  However, he argues that the perpetrator perspective 
“means looking at contested race issues from the vantage point of whites,” thus the 
“perpetrator perspective in law, like the conservatives’ understanding of racism, is 
preoccupied with white guilt or innocence.”170 The perpetrator perspective of course, 
reinforces the notion that racism is primarily a function of individual actors, who can be 
found and punished, rather than reflecting on the institutional and systemic racial norms 
of society.   
The normative quality of this perpetrator perspective was clearly evidenced in 
Croson when O’Connor argued that there was no “strong basis in evidence for its 
conclusion that remedial action was necessary,” because the “the city points to no 
evidence that qualified minority contractors have been passed over for city contracts or 
subcontracts, either as a group or in any individual case.”171 On this basis Justice 
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O’Connor concluded that “[p]roper findings in this regard are necessary to define both 
the scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its effects.  Such 
findings are also serve to assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal 
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the 
service of the goal of equality itself.”172 Thus O’Connor reinforces the ideology of the 
perpetrator perspective by insisting that the “norm” is “equal treatment of all racial 
groups” absent a “finding” of a specific non-white contractor that has been discriminated 
against by the old boy network of white contractors.  Under O’Connor logic, in the 
absence finding a bad actor or guilty perpetrator who had discriminated against a non-
white contractor, she assumed that the “normal” operation of the system of state 
contracting was one that respected the “equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups.”173 
iii. The Continuing Centrality of Racism 
However, in stark contrast, when viewed from a non-white-centered perspective 
racism is neither a thing of the past nor the product of isolated and individual rogue 
bigots or guilty perpetrators.  Instead, from a non-white-centered perspective racism is 
considered to be still “deeply entrenched in this polity and defines the institutions of this 
country, not so much by being an exception to the general rule of fairness, but rather by 
being central to the polity’s very understanding of fairness, justice, and virtue.”174 
Moreover, in further stark contrast to the white-centered perspective, from the 
non-white centered perspective, equal racial treatment is not the “norm.”  Instead, it 
regards racism not as an extraordinary malfunction, but rather as a fundamental feature of 
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society that is reflected not simply in the acts of individual whites but also, and most 
importantly, in the very structures and institutions of the society itself.  From this 
perspective, this sort of institutional racism is not an exceptional occurrence that exists 
only on the fringes of mainstream American society, but rather lies at the very heart of 
the system.  This view considers racism to be the function of systemic forces within 
society and its institutions that operate silently, seamlessly, and incessantly to privilege 
whites and burden non-whites, without the need for any intentional behavior by specific 
racist individual actors.  In short, from the non-white-centered-perspective, racism is not 
an exceptional act of individual, rogue, bad actors, but is a normative and endemic 
feature of the very structure of the status quo. 
Moreover, from the non-white-centered-perspective racism is a phenomenon that 
can operate either, consciously or unconsciously.175 In fact, from this perspective the 
unconscious operation of racism constitutes it’s most ubiquitous and common 
manifestation within personal, institutional and societal contexts and constitutes a 
discursive process that operates in the absence of formal and explicit racial restrictions in 
order to lower the barriers to access for whites and raise them for non-whites.   
Thus through its reliance on the white-centered perspective, the ideology of white 
innocence reflects a set of “shared narratives and ideologies,” through which “federal 
courts have mythically transformed systemic racism into an individualism” that reflects 
the availability of “choices [that] most people of color do not have.”176 Again, as 
implicated in the opening lines of this article, from the non-white-centered perspective 
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the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005 provided stark evidence of the 
continuing salience of race in America. This is poignantly and tragically illustrated by the 
fact that over one hundred thousand people, mostly black and poor were left behind 
during the evacuation of New Orleans because their abject poverty deprived them of any 
ready means to leave before the city was virtually destroyed by the greatest natural 
disaster in American history.177 
Moreover, as the nation watched the horror unfolding daily on their television 
screens, day after day tens of thousands of poor blacks were left to fend for themselves in 
the ravaged aftermath of the storm, without food, water, medical help, or security.178 In 
the nightmare and human tragedy that an inundated and devastated New Orleans had 
become after this incredible disaster, we will never know how many poor blacks died or 
suffered serious injury waiting for government rescue that either never came, or came too 
late.179 In short, while it may not have been clear to many before the flood, it certainly 
was clear afterward that in many ways “blacks live in a different world from whites.”180 
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 As starkly summarized by Professor Addis “put simply, while most whites see 
racism as an occasional unfortunate interruption to the institutional and individual 
commitments to the values of equal opportunity and equal treatment, most blacks see 
racism as a daily routine by which the lives of black people are systematically and 
institutionally devalued.”181 Moreover, he argues that “the very breadth of this 
devaluation suggests that the institutions of this country are interlinked and that they 
recycle the process of devaluation.”182 
4.  Innocent of Perpetuating or Benefiting from Racism 
From the white-centered perspective, the current disproportionate social, 
economic, and political benefits enjoyed by whites are direct reflections of individual 
merit and hard work. This vantage point does not admit any contemporary role or 
influence for America’s long history of officially sanctioned racial subordination.  One 
group of scholars has pointed out that it is striking “that a majority of whites do not see 
the centuries of slavery and segregation as bringing whites substantial socioeconomic 
 
whole segment of society that’s being left behind.  When you tell people to evacuate, these people didn’t 
have any way to leave.   They didn’t have cars, any SUV’s… [t]his reminded me of Somalia.  But this is 
America.  This is an embarrassment. It’s a shame.  It’s a national disgrace.”) 
181 See Addis, supra  (noting that “the most glaring examples of such devaluation occurs in the criminal 
justice system.”) See also, id (“by devaluation I mean to refer to the situation when the lives and well-being 
of “African Americans are systematically and institutionally given less weight than those of European 
Americans, and are consequently deemed dispensable either when they are in some way perceived to be 
inconsistent with, or to not advance, the interests and well-being of European American.”)id. See also, 
Derrick Bell, INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY!!! <CITE>;  
182 Addis, supra at 2257 
45
benefits.”183 Thus, from this perspective whiteness is thought of as being innocent of 
having derived any contemporary benefit from racism.  
This aspect of the ideology of white innocence is vividly expressed in the early 
writings of Judge Anton Scalia, prior to joining the High Court and Judge Robert Posner.  
In their analysis, white innocence appears to have two distinct and inter-related 
components.  First, whites are innocent to the extent that they took “no part in” either the 
creation or the “perpetuation” of the historic domination and subordination of non-white 
and especially Black people.  Second, white innocence is a function of whites “deriving 
no profit” or “in any demonstrable sense benefit[ing]” from the existence of 
discrimination and subordination.  
Prior to joining the Supreme Court, Justice Anton Scalia addressed the meaning 
of innocence in “forcefully articulate[ing] the objections to – and the resentment of – the 
compensatory justification of affirmative action.”184 In describing how his own father 
was racially innocent, he also articulated his sense of a working definition of white 
innocence that evoked the personal absence of participation in or receipt of benefits from 
the condemned activity.  He wrote that: 
“My father came to this country when he was a teenager.  Not only had he never 
profited from the sweat of any black man’s brow, I don’t think he’d ever seen a black 
man.  There are, of course, many white ethnic groups that came to this country in 
great numbers relatively late in its history – Italians, Jews, Poles – who not only took 
no part in, derived no profit from, the major historic suppression of the currently 
acknowledged minority groups, but were in fact themselves the object of 
discrimination by the dominant Anglo-Saxon majority.  To be sure, in relatively 
recent years some or all of these groups have been the beneficiaries of discrimination 
against blacks, or have themselves practiced discrimination, but to compare their 
racial debt…with that of those who plied the slave trade, and who maintained a 
 
183 Brown, Whitewashing Race supra at 15 (“Another national survey found that most whites did not think 
that whites as a group had benefited from past or present discrimination against black Americans.”) 
184 Scalia, Commentary—The Disease as Cure, 147, 152 (1979).  See also, Sher, Justifying Reverse 
Discrimination in Employment, 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 159, 160—62 (1975) 
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formal caste system for many years thereafter, is confuse a mountain with a 
molehill.”185 
As Professor Fiscus points out, Richard Posner, “made essentially the same 
argument…less passionate than Scalia but no less logical,” when he wrote that “the 
members of minority groups who receive preferential treatment will often be those who 
have not been the victims of discrimination while the non-minority people excluded 
because of preferences are unlikely to have perpetrated, or to have been in any 
demonstrable sense benefited from, the discrimination.”186 Thus, the Scalian and Posner 
views of white innocence consist of the absence of participation in or perpetuation of 
racial discrimination, and the absence of deriving any personal benefit from the existence 
of that discrimination. 
Upon close examination, Justice Scalia’s definition of innocence as the absence of 
participation and benefit from racism, appears to be incoherent because of a serious 
internally inconsistency.  Although he asserts that he is describing white innocence in the 
absolute sense, as he writes, they “took no part in, derived no profit from, the major 
historic suppression of the currently acknowledged minority groups, but were in fact 
themselves the object of discrimination by the dominant Anglo-Saxon majority.”187 
However, he also asserts that although these late European immigrants had no part in 
creating the “major historic suppression[s]” of people of color, they later did in fact 
 
185 Scalia, Commentary—The Disease as Cure, 147, 152 (1979).  See also, Sher, Justifying Reverse 
Discrimination in Employment, 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 159, 160—62 (1975) (describing “a class 
of persons, most often white males, who themselves may be innocent of any race-based wrongdoing…who 
may have enjoyed no personal advantages traceable to past racial injustices.”) id.   
186CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC, supra at 12-13.  
187 See supra 
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participate in that suppression, as he notes that they “have themselves practiced 
discrimination.”188 
In addition, although Scalia argues that those immigrants, like his father, “derived 
no profit” or benefit from the historic suppression of people of color, he also admits that 
“some or all of these groups have been the beneficiaries of discrimination against 
blacks.”  Perhaps mindful of his own internal logical inconsistency, Scalia does not 
conclude from this analysis that immigrants like his father were innocent in any absolute 
sense, but rather, merely relatively innocent in comparison to those who personally as he 
says, “plied the slave trade, and maintained a formal caste system for many years.”189 
It is thus clear that notwithstanding its absolutist billing, Scalia’s logic does not 
lead to the conclusion that he claims for it.  This is evident by his conclusion that “to 
compare th[e] racial debt” of those immigrants groups who “have been the beneficiaries 
of discrimination against blacks, or have themselves practiced discrimination…with that 
of those who plied the slave trade, and who maintained a formal caste system for many 
years thereafter, is to confuse a mountain with a molehill.”190 Thus, in Scalia’s terms 
late European immigrants like his father were not completely free of racial guilt.  Instead 
their own acts of racial discrimination and personal benefit from the racial caste system, 
renders their degree of culpability a relative “molehill,” in comparison to the “mountain” 




190 Scalia, Commentary—The Disease as Cure, 147, 152 (1979).  See also, Sher, Justifying Reverse 
Discrimination in Employment, 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs 159, 160—62 (1975) (describing “a class 
of persons, most often white males, who themselves may be innocent of any race-based wrongdoing…who 
may have enjoyed no personal advantages traceable to past racial injustices.”) id.   
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 Thus, despite its billing, even Scalia does not assert that late arriving European 
whites are “innocent” per se, but merely comparatively so, in contrast to those who were 
actually personally involved in the slave trade, and Jim Crow segregation.   It seems an 
odd turn of logic to base a sense of contemporary innocence on the existence of 
significantly greater historic culpability.  Under this odd Scalian logic, it could be argued 
that so long as there are greater evil doers in the historic past, even admitted 
contemporary evil doers are somehow immunized, and rendered innocent, so long as their 
evilness does not surpass an imaginary quantum of past evil.   
Thus, Scalian white innocence seems a perverse form of comparative innocence 
that no court would accept as exculpating.  In essence, to cry that there were once those 
worse than me, is hardly a reason to conclude that one’s own culpability should be 
diminished as a consequence.  This is a sort of “Attila the Hun” defense; which provides 
that so long as one can invoke Attila’s past savagery as surpassing one’s own, one can 
claim a type of relative innocence.  It is charitable to characterize this sort of defense of 
white innocence as fundamentally irrational and it appears to only be intelligible and 
intellectually coherent through the white-centered-perspective.  
 
i. A Stacked Deck 
 In their recent study on the “myth of colorblindness” one group of scholars has 
likened the experience of being white in contemporary America with the “well known 
philosophical maxim, [that] the last thing a fish notices is the water.”191 In this way they 
argue that because of this type of immersion phenomenon “things that are unproblematic 
seem natural and tend to go unnoticed,” thus “fish take the water they swim in for 
 
191 Brown, surpa Whitewashing Race, at 34   
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granted, just as European Americans take their race as a given, as normal.”192 As a 
consequence, most whites “cannot see how this society produces advantages for them 
because these benefits seem so natural that they are taken for granted, experienced as 
wholly legitimate.”193 Because of this total immersion in social and cultural whiteness, 
most whites quite “literally do not see how race permeates America’s institutions—the 
very rules of the game—and its distribution of opportunities and wealth.”194 As a result 
of failing to appreciate their racially immersed condition in a society awash with 
whiteness, most whites take their “racial location for granted” which leads them “to 
ignore the way in which race loads the dice in favor of European Americans while 
simultaneously restricting African Americans’ access to the gaming table.”195 Thus 
ultimately, to most whites “white privilege, like the water that sustains fish, is invisible in 
their analysis.”196 However, its invisibility does not lessen the grip of white privilege on 
access to social benefits and opportunities, nor ameliorate its dampening effect on non-
white aspirations and efforts. 
 
ii. Personal Benefit 
For these reasons, analyzing the white-centered-perspective analysis on racial 
reality can be instructive and illuminating because “understanding a person’s racial 
 
192 Id (“White Americans my face difficulties in life—problems having to do with money, religion, family – 
but race is not one of them.  White Americans can be sanguine about racial matters because their race has 
not been (until recently) visible to the society in which they live.”) 
193 Id  
194 Id 
195 Id  
196 Id  
If white Americans make no effort to hear the viewpoints and see the experiences of others, their awareness 
of their own privileged racial status will disappear.  They can convince themselves that life as they 
experience it on their side of the color line is simply the objective truth about race.  But while this allows 
them to take their privileged status for granted, it also distorts their understanding. 
 
id at 35. 
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worldview from the perspective of racial identity theory also reveals how a person 
participates in and understands individual, institutional, and cultural racism.”197 This is 
true because, in America “every white person…is socialized with implicit and explicit 
racial messages about him- or herself and members of visible racial/ethnic groups…[and] 
[a]ccepting these messages results in racism become an integral component of each white 
person’s ego or personality.”198 As a consequence, “evolving a nonracist white identity 
begins with individuals accepting their whiteness and recognizing the ways in which they 
participate in and benefit from individual, institutional, and cultural racism.”199 
From a non-white-centered-perspective, the argument that contemporary whites 
derive no benefit from their whiteness, is hopelessly naïve because of the substantial 
“cash value”200 that is associated with whiteness.  As George Lipsitz has pointed out  
“white Americans are encouraged to invest in whiteness, to remain true to an identity that 
provides them with resources, power, and opportunity.”201 Moreover, “as long as we 
define social as the sum total of conscious and deliberative individual activities, we will 
 
197 IMPACTS OF RACISM ON WHITE AMERICANS, SECOND EDITION (Benjamin P. Bowser and 
Raymond G. Hunt, eds.) 4 (Sage Publications, 1996) [hereinafter Bowser and Hunt, Impacts of Racism] 
(“Having a knowledge of racial identity can serve to deepen our understanding of the mechanism used to 
maintain racism in all of its forms.”) 
198 Id. (“Is every white person in the United States racist?  Not necessarily.  Is every white person exposed 
to social, institutional, and cultural messages that promote racism? Yes.  What matters…is how he or she 
interprets the messages received about racial groups…[in order to avoid]…the color-blind status, where the 
existence of race and racism are denied but the person’s behavior and attitudes are guided by racist 
principles that have never been questioned.”) id at 4-5 
199 Id.  
200 Lipsitz, Possessive Investment in Whiteness supra at vii (“Whiteness is invested in like property, but it 
is also a means of accumulating property and keeping it from others.”) id at viii. 
201 Id , pointing out that whiteness: 
“accounts for advantages that come to individuals through profits made from housing secured in 
discriminatory markets, through unequal educations allocated to children of different races, through insider 
networks that channel employment opportunities to the relatives and friends of those who have profited 
most from present and past racial discrimination, and especially through intergenerational transfers of 
inherited wealth that pass on the spoils of discrimination to succeeding generations.” 
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be able to discern as racist only individual manifestations of personal prejudice and 
hostility.”202 
II. White Innocence and Affirmative Action 
Affirmative action is particularly fertile ground from which to gain insight into 
the nature and significance of differences in racial perspectives.  This is true because 
affirmative action has been, and promises to continue to be an especially polarizing, 
contentious, and socially combustible topic with both opposing camps composed largely, 
although not exclusively, along racial lines.203 At the core of the disagreement between 
these opposing factions is a fundamental miscommunication.204 This miscommunication 
is a result of the differences in the racially distinct starting points that ground and orient 
each of their respective racial perspectives.  Thus, their argument is not so much over the 
substantive fairness or effectiveness of affirmative action programs per se, as it is over 
the appropriate perspective from which to view it.     
For example, this article argues that those who oppose affirmatives action see the 
issue from a white-centered perspective that, among other things, presumes that the 
social, political, economic, and educational status quo is racially neutral, and that the 
 
202 Id at 20 (“Systemic, collective, and coordinated group behavior consequently drops out of sight.  
Collective exercises of power that relentlessly channel rewards, resources, and opportunities from one 
group to another will not appear “racist” from this perspective, because they rarely announce their intention 
to discriminate against individuals.  Yet they nonetheless give racial identities their sinister social meaning 
by giving people from different races vastly different life chances.”) 
203 See Skrentny, Colorlines supra at 48 (pointing out that “Affirmative action remains one of the most 
fiercely contested legacies of the civil rights era.  …In a short period of time affirmative action moved from 
obscurity to prominence…”) 
204 See Skrentny, Colorlines supra at 208 (“affirmative action is about the place racial groups should 
occupy in “American society.  Despite all the high, abstract, and moralizing rhetoric, affirmative action is 
about concrete matters of who gets what.  A rhetoric centered around a mutual recognition and 
accommodation of legitimate interests is a far more promising basis for racial progress than are brickbats of 
moral superiority now wielded so vigorously by those on the Left and the those on the Right.”)  
52
social and political debt for slavery was exhausted with the formal dismantling of Jim 
Crow and officially enforced racial segregation and subordination, and the enactment of 
antidiscrimination legislation.   Moreover, this view is also premised on the assumption 
that contemporary whites bear no personal responsibility for existing racial inequality 
because they had no personal role in the creation of past racism and do not participate in 
perpetuating or benefiting from its legacy in the form of present-day racial subordination 
and discrimination.   
However, this article also argues that those who support affirmative action as a broad 
policy matter and see the issue from a non-white-centered perspective have reached very 
different conclusions.  A non-white-centered perspective on this issue, presumes that the 
social, political, economic, and educational status quo is not neutral but is in fact heavily 
racially skewed in favor of whites and against non-whites.  This view is premised on the 
presumption that America’s social and political debt for its historic racial sins of slavery, 
Jim Crow and the legacy of legalized discrimination has not been exhausted by the 
removal of express and formal barriers of racial discrimination.  Instead, this perspective 
posits that informal, systemic, institutional, psychological, and unconscious racism 
continues to shape and benefit the lives of every white person and to burden the lives of 
every non-white person, solely on the basis of race.205 
Moreover, this view also holds that contemporary whites do in fact bear a 
considerable personal responsibility for the continuing legacy of racial inequality, 
because although clearly they are not responsible for the creation of the historical causes 
of racism, nonetheless they feed, nourish, aid, abet, and benefit from the legacy of racism 
every day in a myriad of ways.  As a consequence, they are deeply implicated and 
 
205 See Lipsitz, Possessive Investment in Whiteness supra at 20 
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invested in maintaining the racial status quo of deep and continuing racial inequality.   
From this perspective it appears that, whether consciously or unconsciously, most whites 
engage in personal acts every day that actively reinforce, perpetuate and reinscribe racial 
distinctions and promote racial discrimination in society.  Thus, from the non-white-
centered perspective, the idea that most contemporary whites are innocent of active 
personal participation in promoting, reinscribing, and benefiting from racism is naive.    
Affirmative action in education and employment has been combustible social 
tender and the source of continuing, deep, and significant white resentment since it was 
first introduced.206 In fact it has been suggested that the depth of white resentment is so 
profound that, “a number of whites dislike the idea of affirmative action so much and 
perceive it to be so unfair that they have come to dislike blacks as a consequence.”207 
Thus it is important to keep in mind, as Glen Loury has pointed out that, “the ideological 
meanings of a contested racial policy like affirmative action are determined within a 
social-cognitive matix that is raced. A similar policy with a different set of beneficiaries 
might not have the same ideological resonance.”208 These ideological meanings are 
distinctly racial and are reinforced and reinscribed by the language and images that are 
employed by the Court in articulating the basis of their decisions in racially inflected 
 
206 Cite introduction of Aff/Ac 
207 See Thernstrom, Black and White, supra at 312 (citing SNIDERMAN AND PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF 
RACE 8) It is striking, and perhaps illustrative of the difference in racial vantage points, that these 
otherwise reasonable scholars can actually believe that whites who were not racists before affirmative 
action have been driven into the arms of racism, and began to “dislike blacks” solely as a consequence of 
the existence of these programs.  Of course they offer neither rational argument nor empirical evidence to 
support this dramatic rhetoric.  Moreover, from a non-white vantage point a compelling persuasive 
argument can be made that any whites who claim to have been so malignantly converted in their racial 
views solely on the basis of affirmative action, are woefully deficient in credibility and are probably 
engaged in an apparently not so transparent effort to justify preexisting racial antipathy towards blacks.   
208 Loury, Anatomy supra at 72-73 (“More generally, if when assessing a policy observers make use of a 
causal specification that has been colored by racial stigma, then they may perceive that policy as being 
especially threatening to their ideological position.”) 
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claims of constitutional violations. Behind these ideological meanings are the Court’s 
“unstated assumptions about the nature of difference,”209 which reveal not a racially 
neutral jurisprudence but one which is decidedly and constitutionally impermissibly 
overly concerned with the welfare of one particular racial group – whites.210 
As George Lipsitz has observed, in resenting and resisting affirmative action, whites act 
like believe that they are “innocent victims of remedies for a disease that did not exist.”211 
Notably, the ideology of white innocence lies at the very heart of this white resentment.  Thus, 
disrupting this ideology may well constitute the illusive Holy Grail that can redeem such 
ubiquitous white resentment. The late scholar, Ron Fiscus presciently made this point in the early 
1990’s when he observed that: 
“the innocent persons argument is more than an important constitutional argument.  It is a 
widely held, racially polarizing social argument.  The near-universal belief in it is without 
doubt the single most powerful source of popular resentment of affirmative action. If the 
belief could somehow be undercut, the resentment toward affirmative action and the 
associated racial polarization might be diminished.212 
209 Minnow, supra at __ 
210 Skrentny, Colorlines supra at 48 
 
At the heart of the battle over affirmative action was a debate about the very meaning of liberalism itself. 
…The deep-rooted white opposition to affirmative action was at bottom a defense of a racial status quo that 
marginalized blacks un urban labor markets—a situation solidified by New Deal labor and economic 
policies that disproportionately benefited white workers.  Affirmative action’s critics masked their own 
unacknowledged identity politics in seemingly neutral, universalist rhetoric that they themselves had 
rejected only a few years earlier.  
 
211 Lipsitz, Possessive Investment in Whiteness supra at 55  
212 RONALD J. FISCUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: MAKING 
THE CASE FOR QUOTAS 7-8 (Stephen L. Wasby, ed.) (Duke University Press, 1992) [hereinafter Fiscus, 
Constitutional Logic]. (“Until the innocent persons argument is squarely met, no defense of affirmative 
action is going to be wholly persuasive…more forcefully…until the premise of innocence is effectively 
refuted, no degree of burdening [of whites by affirmative action] will be principled.”)  Interestingly, 
although a supporter of affirmative action as a wise and important public and private policy, Professor 
Fiscus unconsciously associates the “near universal” belief in white innocence, primarily among whites, as 
being representative of all Americans.  Similarly, in suggesting that affirmative action will not be 
persuasive without reconciling the innocence argument, the question that immediately presents itself is, 
‘persuasive to whom -- whites?’  This phraseology ignores all the non-whites (and whites) to whom 
affirmative action is already persuasive despite impassioned claims of white innocence.  This typifies the 
association of whiteness with humanity or at least with all (real) Americans generally. In this inadvertent 
phrasing he has effectively erased all non-white (as well as white) Americans who do not “believe” in the 
“self evident truth” of white innocence.   In addition the exclusive focus on white resentment ignores the 
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Professor Fiscus concludes that if the premise of white innocence “could be rebutted, or 
at least narrowed…some critics of affirmative action might well be persuaded of its 
constitutionality …others [would] be deprived of a seemingly powerful argument against 
it…[and] supporters …would gain new confidence that their judgment is correct.”   Thus, 
because of its power to engender such profound white resentment, in the hands of the Supreme 
Court, the rhetoric of white innocence is not simply used to resolve affirmative action claims; 
instead it amounts to a power that is wielded as a weapon of white supremacy in order to justify, 
legitimize, and maintain the existing racial status quo.  Under such circumstances it is hardly 
surprising that America’s debate over affirmative action consists largely of such strident 
opposing camps.213 
A.   Whiteness as Coterminous with Innocence 
Although the Court frequently invokes the rhetoric of innocence and equates it 
presumptively with whiteness, it neither provides nor even attempts to provide, a 
definition for the term.214 This is especially problematic, because without some degree of 
 
fact that there is non-white resentment as well. In fact, much of the non-white resentment that is ignored by 
the white gaze, is based not simply on the presence and dominance of white supremacy, but also on the fact 
that so many whites perceive of themselves as racially innocent.  Non-white, but especially Black 
resentment is rarely ever discussed unless it is demeaned by being characterized as “black rage,” “black 
outrage” or “black anger,” but never dignified simply as resentment.  In short, when whites react negatively 
to race, they are being resentful, when blacks do the same, they are exhibiting rage.  This rhetoric 
perpetuates the essentialism of whiteness and the marginality of non-whiteness, and paints whiteness as 
synonymous with reasonableness and non-whiteness with irrationality and bestiality.  See Thernstrom, 
Black and White, supra at 496-97.  
213 See, Lawrence D. Bobo, Race, Interests, and Beliefs about Affirmative Action: Unanswered Questions 
and New Directions, in Skrentny, Colorlines supra at 191 (“The debate over affirmative action often seems 
to involve two warring camps, each of which stakes a mutually exclusive claim to moral virtue…opponents 
see their antagonists as advancing a morally bankrupt claim to victim status and the spoils of racial 
privilege… ”) 
214 The ideology of innocence does not appear to have a particularly significant influence on the 
Court in the absence of race.  In stark contrast to its receptivity to the concerns of white innocence, the 
Court appears to be surprisingly resistant and unsympathetic to claims of both “actual innocence,” (See 
___) as well as “constitutional innocence,” (See_____).  Therefore, it appears that the power of innocence 
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definitional precision, the Court’s invocation of white innocence has no substantive 
content that can be reasonably applied, rejected, or even rationally evaluated by the lower 
courts.215 However, although it is not always clear precisely what the Court means when 
it invokes the rhetoric of innocence, it is clear who they are referring to– they are 
referring to whites.    Thus, through the deployment of the rhetoric of white innocence, 
the Court appears to have constructed a mythologized and racialized concept of 
constitutionally cognizable innocence that does not just include whites, but is in fact 
coterminous with whiteness.216 
The equivalence of whiteness with innocence is revealingly illustrated in Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter.217 In discussing the second prong of the strict 
scrutiny test, she explained that the essence of the ‘narrowly tailored’ requirement is its 
capacity to ensure that race conscious remedies are constitutionally sustainable only to 
the extent that they “work the least harm possible to... innocent persons competing for the 
same benefit.”218 She goes on to argue that, “[t]o be narrowly tailored, a race conscious 
admissions program must not unduly burden individuals who are not members of the 
favored racial … groups.”219 
over the courts is not based on innocence alone but rather on the particular power of the ideology of white 
innocence.   
215 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THIRD EDITION-VOLUME 
ONE,  (Foundation Press, 2000) 368 (arguing that “the ultimate issue is whether it is possible and 
appropriate to translate the principles underlying the constitutional provision at issue into restrictions on 
government, or affirmative definitions of individual liberty, which courts can articulate and apply.”) 
216 Although O’Connor also says that “Narrow tailoring, therefore, requires that a race-conscious admission 
program not unduly harm members of any racial group,” Id at 29 the overall tenor of her references to and 
use of the concept of innocence strongly suggests that she, along with the rest of the current Court, does in 
fact equate innocence with whiteness.  
217 Grutter v. University of Michigan 
218 Grutter at 29  
219 Id at 29 (“[t]he purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that the means chosen fit the 
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was 
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”)   
57
In this way, Justice O’Connor argues that the proper constitutional measure of 
narrow tailoring consists of the extent to which race conscious remedies avoid harming a 
group she describes as “innocent persons.”  This group of innocent persons consists of 
those who are not included in the so-called “favored racial group.”  Thus Justice 
O’Connor characterize the beneficiaries of race conscious programs as members of a 
“favored racial group” and conversely by implication, those who do not necessarily 
benefit as members of a non-favored racial group.  Since the members of the “favored 
racial groups” in race conscious programs are by definition non-white persons, 
O’Connor’s logic clearly suggests that the category of “innocent persons,” she has in 
mind who must be protected from harm by strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring test, consists 
exclusively of an undifferentiated group of bedfellows who are all white.   
Moreover, it also suggests that the primary unifying characteristics of the 
members of this group are their whiteness, innocence, and victimization from race 
conscious affirmative action programs.   Any doubt in this regard is resolved by her 
conclusion in Grutter in which she noted that the Law School affirmative action program 
had passed constitutional muster because, “in the context of its individualized 
inquiry…the admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”220 
Since O’Connor does not define the term innocence, she does not attempt to 
establish the innocence of this all white group she imagines.  Thus from the Court’s 
perspective, the racial innocence of whites is not a result of logical argument with which 
one could take issue, instead it appears to be judicially noticed and thereby beyond 
debate.  It is indeed problematic that the Court simply presumes the existence of racial 
innocence, racially equates it with whiteness and neither engages in nor insists that it be 
 
220 Grutter, supra at 30 
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subject to elements of proof or critical inquiry of any sort.  It is especially problematic 
because to the extent that innocence becomes constitutionally coterminous with 
whiteness, how is non-whiteness to be regarded – as not innocent or guilty?  What are the 
implications of an implicit constitutional presumption of a binary juxtaposition of white 
innocence against non-white guilt?  Moreover, it is also both curious and highly 
problematic that this grouping of innocent whites is obviously quite over- inclusive.  By 
definition it must commingle such interesting bedfellows as committed white anti-racists 
on one extreme, to rabid and committed white supremacists on the other.221 
Under this theory, the general category of whites would include people from both 
extremes of the innocence spectrum and all the gradations in between.  As such, to the 
extent that the concept of innocence is thought to be coterminous with whiteness, it is 
clearly over-inclusive because it would include many who are clearly not innocent, such 
as the Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux as well as many who are such as committed white 
anti-racists.   Therefore, the Court’s deployment of the notion of innocence is to be 
inherently too imprecise and over inclusive a concept to be worthy of serious 
constitutional consideration. 
 
B.  Affirmative Action and the Ideology of White Innocence 
 
221 Although by logical inference O’Connor assumed that the plaintiff Barbara Grutter was an “innocent 
white,” suppose instead that it was known that the plaintiff was an avowed white supremacist who hated 
anyone who was not white, actively practiced racial discrimination and advocated violent racial holy war?  
Under O’Connor’s view of white innocence even this person would be considered racially innocent.  
Therefore under O’Connor’s view, racial guilt has been defined out of existence because all whites are by 
definition racially innocent without regard to their individual views, values, or politics.  Thus, one could 
argue that her category of innocent whites is not only overbroad, but also fatally incoherent because it 
assumes racial innocence solely on the basis of skin color regardless of the individual facts of particular 
white lives that would strongly contest that description.    
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Each of the four primary elements of the ideology of white innocence identified 
earlier have been deployed by the Court, to one extent or another, in resolving racially 
inflected claims of constitutional protection.  However, the Court’s primary reference 
when it invokes the rhetoric of white innocence appears to focus on the third and fourth 
elements of the ideology involving racism and racial benefit.  Frequently the Court’s 
invocation of white innocence is revealed as being deeply embedded in a metric which 
the Court refers to as strict scrutiny,222 which requires that in order to pass constitutional 
muster, explicitly race conscious government programs must satisfy a bifurcated test 
which requires first, that they serve a compelling state interest,223 and second be narrowly 
tailored224 to achieve that interest. 
 
1. Innocent of Race 
Recall that the earlier discussion of this element of the ideology of white 
innocence points out the inherent contradiction in this element.  One the one hand, the 
white-centered-perspective holds that whiteness is not a race, but rather being simply the 
ordinary and regular unraced norm.  However, simultaneously, they are also acutely 
aware of their own racialized whiteness, and the non-whiteness of racial others, and 
 
222 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989)   (Holding that strict scrutiny must be applied to all government 
use of racial classifications, whether invidious, remedial, or benign.) 
223 Id 
224 The standard of narrow tailoring does not require that such programs be the most narrowly tailored 
alternative possible. As the Court said in Grutter “narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every 
conceivable race neutral alternative, [it]…does however, require serious, good faith consideration of 
workable race neutral alternatives.”) Grutter at 27.  See also, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 
(1986) (noting that the standard of narrow tailoring “require[s] only a good faith effort…to come within a 
range demarcated by the goal itself.”) id at 495 and Grutter at 23.  See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co. 
(1989),  The narrow tailoring standard serves the important constitutional purpose of ensuring that any race 
conscious remedial program not only serves a compelling state interest, but also “fit[s]…the compelling 
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate 
racial prejudice or stereotype.” Grutter at 21, citing Crosen at 493   
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consider those differences to be somehow reflective of real and essential biological 
differences.   
This element of the ideology of whiteness is on display in the Court’s affirmative 
action jurisprudence and reflected in the Court’s discussion of racially neutrality. In 
Grutter, O’Connor’s majority opinion noted, again in the context of discussing the narrow 
tailoring aspect of the strict scrutiny test, that although “narrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative…[it] does however, require 
serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve 
the diversity that the university seeks.”225 
Taking race into account, or its opposite, not doing so or race neutrality, are 
generally and demeaningly understood to mean considering the non-whiteness of non-
whites.  However, taking race into account should also require considering the whiteness 
of whites; and there have been precious few calls for the elimination of taking this racial 
marker into account by affirmative action’s detractors.  In effect, one could argue that 
their position amounts to one in which they want to ignore non-whiteness, especially 
blackness, but they want to continue to take into account whiteness.  
In effect, Justice O’Connor’s view of asking admissions officers to seriously and 
in good-faith consider race neutral alternatives, is tantamount to asking them to do what 
no one in America is capable of doing – that is of imagining an entirely “raceless 
person.”  What would such a person look like; how would they function in a society that 
is so keenly aware and dependant on perceived racial identity; how would their 
racelessness affect their treatment, experiences, and opportunities.  It is an absurd and 
unknowable fantasy in twenty-first century America because there are no unraced people, 
 
225 Grutter, supra at 27 
61
no model or paradigm to draw on from which to even imagine one.  In America, one is 
either white or non-white; race is always there.  Thus, if racial neutrality amounts to 
ignoring non-whiteness, the only coherent category left is whiteness.  As a consequence 
any attempted regime of race neutrality would in effect create a situation where everyone 
would be presumed to be white…not unraced.  
Thus, the Court’s idea of race neutrality is a fantasy of the white-centered-
perspective that projects assumptive whiteness on to every applicant.  There is nothing 
racially neutral about such a program, with or without the express use of racial terms.  As 
a result, those who are in fact white get their files reviewed from a perspective that 
matches their own, which amounts to a racial benefit, not a neutral fact.  However, those 
who are non-white are assumed to be white, and do not get their files read by a 
sympathetic and compatible perspective. In fact, since their files would usually be 
reviewed from a white-centered-perspective, their own racial perspective is neither 
recognized nor valued, and their lives and accomplishments are reviewed from a 
perspective that they do not share.  
More importantly, admission decisions that purport to not take race into account, 
and thereby claim to be racially neutral are fundamentally hypocritical and irrational.  
They are hypocritical because they assume that race can be erased as a relevant factor in 
the development of a person’s life up to the point of application.  Moreover, these 
programs also assume that an individual’s personal racial history of struggle and success 
is irrelevant to a rational evaluation of their future prospects of success and public 
contribution.  
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This view reflects a distinctly white-centered-perspective on race. Because most 
whites have the luxury of not having to think of themselves in racial terms, they can 
easily project that the same must be true of everyone else.  But for most non-whites, and 
especially blacks, racial identity is not something they can afford to ignore, because 
ordinary social intercourse in America is filled with constant reminders to non-whites that 
they are not white.  
The Court’s ideal of racial neutrality is also irrational because, in the context of 
university admissions a candidate’s past strengths and future potential cannot be 
rationally evaluated without all of the candidate’s most relevant pieces of information.  
For many non-white applicants, their racial identity is a relevant piece of information, 
because for them such an identity forms an important part in determining who they are, 
how they got this way, where they want to go, why they want to go there, and the 
strength of their motivation to accomplish those goals.  To arbitrarily ban this type of 
highly relevant and probative information from active consideration by admission 
officials is to be willfully blind to the overall detriment of the applicant’s admission 
prospects and the institution’s commitment to evaluate the whole candidate.  
This position does not depend on a universal relevance of racial experience for all 
non-whites, but rather for the universal allowance for its possibility, recognition, and 
respect. To the extent that race forms an important part of the empirical social reality in 
the lives of many non-white applicants, racial neutrality constitutes an arbitrary, 
irrational, and counterproductive policy that strongly advantages whites and heavily 
burdens non-whites.  In short, such a racially neutral policy is effectively not racially 
neutral at all.  Thus racial neutrality is only coherent and reasonable when considered 
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from a starting point of a white-centered-perspective.  From a non-white-centered-
perspective, it is a policy that appears to be unrealistic, unfair, highly raced, and deeply 
naive.  
 
2. Innocent of Racial Perspective 
The narrative of white innocence constitutes what Toni Morrison calls the 
“timeless and timely narratives upon which expressive language rests, narratives so 
ingrained and pervasive they seem inextricable from reality.”226 Through this rhetorical 
narrative the Supreme Court has deeply insinuated into American constitutional discourse 
a powerful and irresistible association between whites as a group, and innocence; as the 
real victims of affirmative action programs.  This powerful and pernicious rhetorical 
narrative characterizes whites as innocent and helpless victims who metaphorically, have 
been forcibly strapped to the front of the cannon barrel of affirmative action and have 
been unjustly punished for the benefit of the unharmed and the undeserving.   
The Court’s use of the rhetorical narrative of white innocence has been 
remarkably successful in framing and fueling the general affirmative action debate.  This 
is partially because innocence constitutes an essential characteristic of white racial 
identity and of the popular presumption of the racial innocence and neutrality of the law 
generally.  However, the Court’s choice to champion the cause of white innocence has 
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“fueled rather than dowsed”227 the racial flames of discord, division, and distrust in 
American legal discourse and in the popular imagination.  Paradoxically, the Court’s 
approving use of the lanuage of white racial innocence, has implicitly put the 
government’s rhetorical imprimatur on this racialized characterization of innocent white 
victimization.  So much so in fact, that this rhetoric and its various permutations now 
constitute one of the few areas of common ground and uncritical acceptance among many 
who fill the ranks of both supporters and detractors of affirmative action programs.228 
Consequently, both sides in the hotly contested affirmative action debate both wittingly 
and unwittingly accept, reproduce, and reinforce a rhetorical narrative of contemporary 
American racial reality that constructs and perpetuates a normative and discursive association 
between innocence and whiteness.  This congruence of opinion affirming a racialized association 
between whiteness and innocence fundamentally undermines any moral case in support of 
affirmative action programs and strengthens the moral basis of its detractors by allowing them to 
“don the armor of moral innocence in their war against affirmative action.”229 
227 ANATOMY OF RACISM, (David Theo Goldberg, Ed.) (University of Minnesota Press, 1990) 296 
[ANATOMY OF RACISM] 
228 For notable examples of supporters of affirmative action expressing acceptance and support, at some 
level, for the ideology of white innocence in the affirmative action context,  See  City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 548 (1989) (Marshal, J. dissenting, noting that  “like the federal provision, 
Richmond’s has a minimal impact on innocent third parties.”) (emphasis added) and (Blackmun, J. 
dissenting, similarly pointing out that “even though one might sympathize with those who – though 
possibly innocent themselves—benefit from the wrongs of the past decades.”) (emphasis added)  id at 561. 
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR, NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
AMERICAN VALUES, (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, (1996) 159, 160 (arguing that there is a moral cost to 
affirmative action programs because of the harm to whites and suggesting therefore that great care be 
taken to insure that there is a particularly clear need for such programs and that they be carefully limited in 
scope and duration to match that need)  See also,  Patricia J. Williams, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE, AND 
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR, (Harvard University Press, 1991) 60 (arguing that even if 
whites are innocent victims of affirmative action programs, it should not be overlooked that blacks are 
innocent too therefore “it does no one much good, to make race issues contests for some Holy Grail of 
innocence.”) (emphasis added)     
229 Lawrence Bobo, Race Interests, and Beliefs about Affirmative Action: Unanswered Questions and New 
Directions, in COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIAVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
OPTIONS FOR AMERICA, (John David Skrentny, ed) (University of Chicago Press, 2001) 207. 
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By deploying the rhetorical narrative of white innocence, the Court has been able 
to effectively, “alchemize” these “cases about discrimination against disadvantaged 
groups, into narratives in which African Americans [and other non-whites]…seek to 
deprive white[s] …of their rightful interests.”230 Thus, by cloaking the non- favored 
group in affirmative action policies (whites) in the rhetorical narrative of innocence, the 
Court has made innocence synonymous with whiteness.  As a result, “invoking innocence 
has provided the Court with rhetorical cover for its policy choice[s]”231 of either 
approving or disapproving the limited use of race as a legitimate selection criterion, while 
simultaneously advancing the “racial project”232 of preserving and protecting a status quo 
of white dominance and white privilege.  
When the Court adopts the white perspective as the presumptive lens through 
which to see and describe American racial reality, it ratifies and emboldens the segment 
of the public that shares that perspective.  Instead of engaging the nation in a dialogue in 
which it acknowledges that there is more than one appropriate perspective from which to 
see affirmative action, the Court implicitly endorses the view that there is only one 
correct factual description and that is the white perspective.  Moreover, by failing to even 
acknowledge that there is a contest among perspectives, the Court suggests that their 
 
230 Seth Harris, Innocence and the Soprano’s, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577, 580 (2005) [hereinafter Harris, 
Innocence and the Soprano’s]  
231 Id  
232 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  
FROM THE 1960’S TO THE 1990’S 2d Ed. (Routledge, 1994) [RACIAL FORMATION] 56-58 
A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics and 
an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines. Racial projects connect what 
race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday 
experiences are racially organized, based on that meaning. …They are always mutiply determined, 
politically contested, and deeply shaped by their historical context…and always concretely framed…and 
unstable. 
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view is not white at all but in fact a racially neutral, objective description of racial reality, 
rather than the racially biased perspective that it really is.  
 
3.  Innocent of Racism 
As indicated earlier, one of the defining features of the innocence of racism 
element of the ideology of white innocence was the notion that racism is largely a thing 
of the past in contemporary America, with the exception of rogue individual racists who 
act out of a taste for discrimination.  However, from a non-white-centered-perspective, 
the problem of racism is neither solved nor reserved to individual guilty perpetrators. 
Instead, this perspective focuses on systemic racial discrimination that is “the result of the 
ways that racial inequalities were embedded in urban space and urban institutions.”233 
The primary meaning associated with the Court’s use of the rhetoric of white 
innocence appears to be focused on an absence of any white moral blameworthiness for 
racism.  Under this view, when the Court refers to innocence and equates it with 
whiteness, it could be understood to mean that contemporary whites are not responsible 
or blameworthy for the history and legacy of racism in American where “race still 
matters” so very much in terms of access to the good things in life.234 For example, in 
Bakke Justice Powell noted that “there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent 
persons in respondent’s position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their 
making.”235 
233 COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR 
AMERICA, 44  (John David Skrentny, ed) (University of Chicago Press, 2001) [hereinafter Skrentny, 
Colorlines]  
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Similarly, the Court in Bakke also described innocent persons as those who “bear 
no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program 
are thought to have suffered.”236 In his dissent in Adarand, Justice Souter expressed a 
similar sense of white innocence when he said, “the result may be that some members of 
the historically favored race are hurt by that remedial mechanism, however innocent they 
may be of any personal responsibility for any discriminatory conduct.”237 In this sense, 
innocence is regarded as suggesting the absence of personal responsibility or moral 
blameworthiness for creating the racial problems that race conscious programs like 
affirmative action are designed to remedy. 
The ideology of white innocence acts as an inherent dampening factor on the 
compelling state interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard because this test is 
ultimately based on a perception of the significance of race as a social problem and 
involves a sense of proportionality.  This judgment will necessarily be significantly 
influenced by the extent to which racism is considered a thing of the past and only 
contemporaneously manifest by the rogue individual in isolated and non-systemic ways, 
or a contemporary and deeply insidious systemic and institutional problem. By masking 
the contemporaneous, systemic, institutional and daily reality of racism in America, the 
courts can artificially limit the occasions when affirmative action is deemed to be 
necessary and appropriate.   
 The Court’s focus on the innocent whites who could be negatively impacted by 
race conscious programs elides the issue of the systemic, institutional nature of racial 
bias.  The search for racial bogey men in the institutions decisional hierarchy, or its 
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recent historical record, or in an adjudicated finding of actual discrimination, allows the 
Court to avoid the core problem of institutionally racially discriminatory practices that 
are so deeply embedded into the levers of social oppression that the machine of racial 
oppression no longer requires either a caretaker or a rogue operative to keep it 
functioning.  
 If the Court wants to analyze affirmative action programs against an assumptive 
social background of racial reality that views racial discrimination as primarily 
individualistic, consciously intentional, and rare, then it has the burden of establishing 
these factual premises as being real and accurate and not merely a reflection of their 
personal racial bias.  Instead, the Court simply asserts this view of America’s racial 
reality without any attempt to document, analyze, or even acknowledge its contested 
nature.  It is thus asserted as an unraced and objective report of reality, when in fact it is 
little more than a reflection of a distinctly white-centered-view of hotly contested racial 
terrain.  
 From a non-white-centered-perspective, the more appropriate and accurate view 
of racial reality holds that racial discrimination in contemporary America is less the 
product of individual rogue racists and more an institutional, systemic, unconscious, and 
ubiquitous feature of everyday life.  However, rather than even recognizing that there is a 
competing paradigm of racial experience in this respect, the Court imposes its own view 
without comment, suggesting that they are doing nothing more than projecting their own 
personal racial biases as representative of racial reality.   
For example in Croson Justice Stevens concluded that the city’s set aside program 
“stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial 
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discrimination.”238 In making this argument Justice Stevens clearly assumed not only 
that the racial status quo in the city of Richmond was neutral but that the white business 
men engaged in the construction industry were innocent of racial discrimination.  He 
argues that while the class of white contractors “unquestionably includes some white 
contractors who are guilty of past discrimination against blacks, …it is only habit, rather 
than evidence or analysis, that makes it seem acceptable to assume that every white 
contractor covered by the ordinance shares in that guilt.”239 He concludes that this 
category is clearly overbroad because “it must be assumed that at least some [of the white 
contractors] have never discriminated against anyone on the basis of race.”240 
How did Justice Stevens reach the conclusion that “it must be assumed” that at 
least some of the white contractors in Richmond had never engaged in racial 
discrimination against anyone?  He specifically refers to the absence of either “fact or 
reason,” supporting a blanket indictment of the class, yet he provides neither fact nor 
reason in support of his own conclusion of the obviousness of racial innocence among at 
least some members of this group.  Instead his conclusion smacks of a projection of 
personal racial bias and is comprehensible only from a white-centered-perspective. 
However, from a non-white-centered-perspective the history of racism, 
repression, resistance, and avoidance in Richmond supplies ample factual evidence from 
which to conclude that all of the white contractors in the city are presumed to have 
engaged in racial discrimination absent specific evidence to the contrary.241 From this 
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member of the class is of the same race stems from reliance on stereotype rather than fact or reason.”) 
241 See Croson supra at 554 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (“Richmond’s leaders had just witnessed decades of 
publicly sanctioned racial discrimination in virtually all walks of life – discrimination amply documented in 
the decisions of the federal judiciary.  This history of purposefully unequal treatment forced upon 
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perspective, whites do not receive a presumption of being non-racist.  In contrast, Justice 
Stevens’ argument clearly presumes the opposite, that whites are presumed to be non-
racist generally absent evidence to the contrary, a view that indicates that despite the 
substantial evidence of the city’s deeply racist past, all whites should be presumed to be 
non-racist.  This view can only coherent and sustainable from a white-centered-
perspective. 
It is important to note that the City Counsel in Croson was not dominated by blacks bent 
on revenge against the long years of racist city government.  Instead it was a racially mixed 
group that had the full support of the white as well as black members; and the support of the 
white mayor.  When the Court enters into this arena of political compromise of competing racial 
perspectives, it is wholly inappropriate for it to arbitrarily pick the white perspective as the 
controlling matrix by which the constitutionality of the program in question is to be judged.  The 
Court clearly did precisely this, as evidenced by many of its stated conclusions offered in defense 
of its decision.  For example the Court argued that the absence of blacks from meaningful 
participation in the construction industry might be the result, not of long history of racialized 
exclusion by the local players, but rather perhaps because there is something about black people 
that inclines them not to choose to participate in the construction industry. As Justice O’Connor 
observed: 
“There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation, including past 
societal discrimination in education and economic opportunities as well as both black and white 
career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other 
 
minorities, not imposed on them, should raise an inference that minorities in Richmond had much to 
remedy.”)  
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than construction.  The mere fact that black membership in these trade associations is low, 
standing alone, cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”242 
Just precisely what “other industries” did Justice O’Connor have in mind that blacks may 
be “disproportionately attracted to”?  This is a very disturbing and ominous reference and 
whatever she had in mind, the very idea that any racial group would necessarily be inclined 
either toward or away from any particular industry, simply on the basis of their racial 
identification, strongly invokes rejected notions of racial essentialism and stereotyping that are 
supposed to be a relics of America’s racist past, and by any reasonable standard, inappropriate 
measures of constitutional principles.  
However, notions of occupational racial essentialism that naturally inclines black people 
either toward or away from particular industries and occupations is a white stereotype and 
fantasy of long standing in America.  It is therefore clearly a product of a white perspective on a 
racialized “other” which is not shared by blacks themselves or by a non-white-centered 
perspective.  Nevertheless, it was a perspective that was casually adopted by the Court without 
comment, justification, evidentiary support, or any defense whatsoever.  It was in effect, a fact of 
which the Court inappropriately presumed to take judicial notice.  However, in reality, it was 
nothing more than the naked adoption by the Court of the white perspective as the controlling 
matrix of reality, in a manner that is patently arbitrary, and completely at odds with the racial 
compromise worked out fairly in the local political process.      
 The essence of the Court’s error in choosing a particular racial perspective to control its 
view of the case is not necessarily that it has made the wrong choice. The important point is that 
is has made a choice at all.  The metaphysical truth of the competing racial perspectives is not 
within the Court’s province. The practical realities of efficiently and constitutionally managing 
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the affairs of state are the only things with which the Court may be legitimately concerned.  Thus 
where the competing racial perspectives have reached a fair and acceptable compromise in the 
political process the Court has no constitutional basis to interfere.243 
Part of the Court’s problem in this regard stems from what many regard as its 
misunderstanding of the moral imperative of the Equal Protection Clause.  Both Justices 
Kennedy and Scalia explicitly endorsed a view that considers that “the moral imperative” of that 
Amendment is nothing more than “racial neutrality.”244 That is a technical and superficial 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that can withstand neither historical nor rational scrutiny.  
Although it does not exhaust the Amendment, one of its principal targets was the elimination of 
racial caste in America. As Cass Sunstein has persuasively argued in describing the “anticaste 
principle,”245 “an important purpose of the Civil War Amendments was the attack on racial 
caste.”246 The moral imperative of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as all of the Civil War 
Amendments was not to achieve racial neutrality as an end in itself, but rather only to use it as 
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one tool among many to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the sense of racial caste that 
had justified and sustained racial slavery for over 200 years.    
The Court’s willingness to project its own racial views is apparent in other 
contexts as well. For example, in Richmond v. J.A. Croson, the Court argues that the 
affirmative action plan endorsed by the city will likely have a negative impact on black 
business people who would benefit from it.  This is because, as Justice Stevens argues in 
his concurrence, “although it stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven 
charge of past discrimination, it actually imposes a greater stigma on its intended 
supposed beneficiaries.”247 
The disadvantage that Justice Stevens had in mind is caused by the fact that, as he 
observed “a statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an 
assumption that those who are granted this special preference are less qualified in some 
respect that is identified purely by their race.”248 Two questions quickly come to mind. 
First, how does he know this; what is Justice Steven’s authority for this proposition?  
Second, who are the “many” that will perceive affirmative action programs in this way; 
moreover why does their view count for so much with the Court?   
 First, Justice Stevens’s primary legal authority for this proposition is his own 
opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, which he quotes at length.249 Second, clearly the 
“many” that Justice Stevens had in mind consists of those he refers to as the “disfavored 
group,” by which he means whites. Thus, Justice Stevens is explicitly arguing that 
because the white perspective will view this program negatively, and will regard its 
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beneficiaries as “less qualified,” that somehow this is a constitutionally cognizable 
consideration of sufficient importance to weigh heavily in favor of overturning the 
program. As if to emphasize what he apparently believes is a strongly made point, he 
follows the extensive quoted passage from Fullilove by concluding with “accordingly, I 
concur…”250 
Having judicially noticed the white-centered-perspective, without any evidentiary 
support whatsoever, the Court does not then measure it against the non-white perspective 
and engage in a rational evaluation of the competitors. In fact no other perspectives are 
even acknowledged, leaving the clear impression that the white perspective not only 
exhausts the rational field but also reflects the personal views of the individual justices on 
the Court.   
Do non-whites generally agree with this view?  Do blacks generally agree? Do the 
past black beneficiaries agree?  The Court does not know, does not ask, and is apparently 
not interested in knowing.  Instead, its rhetorical language clearly suggests that in the 
Court’s mind, there is only one rational perspective on this issue and it is articulated in 
the white perspective of the “many.”  Thus, the perspective, experience, and opinion of 
the beneficiaries is not relevant.  The white-centered-perspective can determine the 
existence of stigma even better than those who supposedly suffer from its burden.  Again, 
this illustrates the Court’s arbitrary racial preference of the white perspective. 
 Moreover, even if Justice Stevens’s prediction of the white reaction is correct, 
why is it constitutionally relevant?  Unfortunately he does not tell us. Moreover, his 
argument suggests that the degree of resentment and disrespect by the “many” who share 
the white perspective on this matter, will somehow be different than their current view of 
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the beneficiary group if the program was overturned.  However, from a non-white-
centered-perspective it can be reasonably argued that the reality is that the degree of 
racism, of racial disrespect, and resentment of whites toward non-whites, especially 
blacks, and especially in the South, did not begin with affirmative action and would not 
end if affirmative action disappeared tomorrow.  From this perspective such disrespect 
and low regard for blacks by whites already exists, not only in the South but all over 
America, and to such a high degree that whatever incremental addition might be caused 
by Richmond’s program is but a drop in a preverbal bucket of  racism.  In short, it would 
make little or no difference at all in the ambient degree of white resentment.  
Thus the Court fails to adequately justify its choice of the white perspective on the 
issue of resentment and disrespect.  Moreover, it also does not explain why the amount of 
such feelings, even if in fact engendered by this program, would make a difference in the 
racial status quo.  Which leaves the question open, how much white racial resentment is 
necessary in order to be constitutionally cognizable?   Justice Steven’s argument in 
Fullilove, repeated in Croson, and cited in Grutter by Justice O’Connor, suggests that the 
mere fact that white resentment exists at all, in whatever degree, is automatically 
constitutionally cognizable. Therefore, in a stark implication of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it also suggests that non-white resentment has not 
received comparable constitutional consideration.  In fact it has received far less than a 
comparable amount because it has received none at all.   Thus, from a constitutional 
perspective, it appears that racial resentment is only relevant if it is white. 
Finally, there is one additional problem with Justice Stevens’s argument that 
again emphasizes its profound racial influenced quality.  His conclusion regarding 
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negative assumptions about the qualifications of the beneficiaries of racial preference 
programs does not seem to apply outside of the racial arena.  For example, there is no 
evidence of similar assumptions regarding the beneficiaries of veteran’s preference 
programs or of legacy preference programs.    Thus, either Stevens is wrong about the 
reaction to preference programs or the resentment or disrespect he anticipates is not due 
to a rational inference that the beneficiaries of preference must be deficient if they need 
such a program, but rather to the racial identity of the beneficiaries.  However, a non-
white-centered perspective would argue that any white resentment that may be identified 
as emanating from such programs actually pre-dated their creation and used the 
programs’ existence to justify negative feelings that already existed.   
 
III. White Innocence and the Fourth Amendment 
 
The substantive content of the “reasonable person” standard starkly reveals the 
ubiquity and insidiousness of the narrative of white innocence as seen through the lens of 
the white-centered-perspective. Although the Court has never expressly said so, a careful 
analysis of its reasoning in a wide range of cases suggests, at least in the context of 
constitutional criminal law, that the proverbial legal touchstone of the “reasonable 
person” in fact reflects the perspective of the innocent white person.  Thus, the 
“reasonable person” standard is not some abstract, ideological metric that is colorless, 
unraced, or inherently raceless.   
Instead, it is a distinctly socially raced perspective which reflects only one racial 
view and masquerades as objective reality.  Thus as articulated by the Court, the 
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reasonable person standard neither reflects nor respects any account of reality that is not 
mediated through the white-centered-perspective.   Moreover, the Court’s choice of the 
white-centered-perspective as the baseline for the reasonable person standard reflects a 
fundamentally arbitrary and unprincipled racial preference for whiteness in violation of 
constitutional guarantees of both Due Process Clause and Equal Protection251.
1.  Seizure of the Person 
The discipline of constitutional criminal law, particularly the Fourth 
Amendment,252 provides a revealing and illuminating window on the interplay between 
the ideology and rhetoric of white innocence and the racial paradox of competing 
racialized perspectives on reality.  An excellent illustration of how the Court has made 
this arbitrary racial preference for the white over the non-white perspective can be found 
in a line of cases that address the legal standard under which a government seizure of 
one’s person has occurred that is sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment constitutional 
scrutiny. 
 In Florida v. Bostick,253 the defendant claimed that he had been illegally seized 
when “two armed Broward County Sheriff officers wearing bright green “raid” 
jackets,”254 boarded his interstate bus at a rest stop in Florida while they were engaged in 
a random drug interdiction sweep of interstate buses.  When they boarded the bus, “the 
officers admittedly without articulable suspicion picked out the defendant”255 who was 
seated at the rear seat of the bus, and interrogated him.   During this interrogation Bostick 
 
251See infra Section IV 
252 United States Constitution Fourth Amendment 
253 Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2385 (1991) 
254 Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, supra at 975. 
255 Florida v. Bostick, supra 
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remained seated on the rear seat of the bus, while the two officers stood over him in the 
isle. While both officers were armed, one of the officers was “holding a recognizable 
zipper pouch, containing a pistol.”256 Although disputed by Bostick at trial, the trial court 
found as a fact that at the request of the officers Bostick consented to a search of his 
luggage. In his bags the officers found contraband and arrested him for trafficking in 
narcotics.  
 Bostick argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because he had 
been illegally seized by the officers at the time it occurred.  He urged the Court to find 
that under the “free to leave” test articulated in Michigan v. Chesternut, he in fact did not, 
and moreover, no reasonable person similarly situated would have felt free to leave.  In 
support of this position he pointed out that because the police encounter “took place in 
the cramped confines of a bus” it was intimidating because the police “tower[ed] over a 
seated passenger and there was little room to move.”257 Although the Florida Supreme 
Court agreed with Bostick’s characterization of the police encounter, the Supreme Court 
did not and overturned and remanded the case.  
 Writing for the Court Justice O’Connor concluded that under these facts there was 
“some doubt whether a seizure occurred.”258 She argued that the Court had long 
recognized that a seizure did not occur for Fourth Amendment purposes merely because 
“the police ask questions of an individual, ask to examine the individuals identification 
and request consent to search his or her luggage – so long as the officers do not convey a 
 
256 Id at 2384 (citing the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion) 
257 Id at 2386 (in addition, Bostick noted that “the bus was about to depart [and] [h]ad Bostick disembarked, 
he would have risked being stranded and losing whatever baggage he had locked away in the luggage 
compartment.”) id.  
258 Id at 2388 
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message that compliance with their request is required.”259 Both Bostick and the Court 
agreed that the appropriate legal standard governing the constitutional question of seizure 
was to the reasonable person.  However, the Court disagreed that the appropriate question 
was whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave.  Instead, Justice O’Connor 
argued that the correct rule under these circumstances rested less on the “free to leave” 
test, and more “on the principle that those words were meant to capture.”260 
i. Reasonable Person Test 
 Justice O’Connor explained that the traditional free to leave test was inadequate to 
the circumstances of the interior of a bus setting and that the more “appropriate inquiry is 
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ request or otherwise 
terminate the encounter.”261 The Court was emphatic that the “crucial test is whether, 
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct 
would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the 
police presence and go about his business.”262 Moreover, the Court noted that a 
reasonable person could engage in this behavior and ignore the police requests “without 
fearing prosecution.”263 
In measuring the “coercive effect of” Bostick’s “encounter”264 with the police, the 
Court did not find the physical circumstances in the back of the bus particularly 
probative. To the extent that Bostick felt physically confined, the Court concluded that it 
 
259 Id  
260 Id at 2387 
261 Id  
262 Id (citing Chesternut, supra at 569) 
263 Id. (“we have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal 
level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”) (citing Delgado, supra; Royer, supra; and 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed. 2d 357 (1979)/ 
264 Florida v. Bostick, supra at 2387 
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was causally unconnected to the police presence.  Rather, they held that he was “confined 
in a sense, but this was the natural result of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing 
about whether or nor the police conduct at issue was coercive.” 265 Moreover, the Court 
did not consider the fact that one of the officers was holding a pistol in his hand 
particularly coercive either.  Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion, the Court 
recharacterized the Florida Supreme Court’s factual account, and did not acknowledge, as   
Florida court had, that the officer was “holding” a pistol in his had in a “recognizable 
zipper pouch.”266 Instead the Court described the scene as one in which the officer was 
merely “carried a zipper pouch containing a pistol—the equivalent of carrying a gun in a 
holster.”267 
The Court never explained how it reached this conclusion of effective equivalence 
between the pouch and a holster.  Apparently it was a matter which the Court was 
prepared to make a matter of judicial notice.  Moreover, regardless of whether the pistol 
was ‘held’ or ‘carried,’ or whether there was any meaningful distinction between having 
a gun in a holster or in hand, the Court observed that it could not reasonably be a source 
of intimidation because, as Justice O’Connor argued “the gun was never removed from 
its pouch, pointed at Bostick, or otherwise used in a threatening manner.”268 
The Court’s decision in Bostick is remarkable for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which is the deft manner in which the fact that Bostick was a Black man and the 
two police were white was completely erased from the majority’s decision as to what 
 
265 Id  
266 Id at 2384 (citing the Florida Supreme Court) 
267 Id at 2385 
268 Id at 2385 (thus, in referring to Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion Justice O’Connor noted that “the 
dissent’s characterization of the officers as “gun-weilding inquisitor[s]” is colorful, but lacks any basis in 
fact.”) 
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constituted the “totality of the circumstances.”  In this way, as a result of the Court seeing 
the factual scenario of this case through what some have described as “the racial lens of 
colorblindness,”269 Bostick’s Blackness was rendered both invisible and irrelevant.  
However, despite its colorblind rhetoric, it would not be accurate to suggest that the 
Court erased race completely form the case.  The is true because as articulated by the 
Court, the focus of the reasonable person test is only nominally on the citizen; it is more 
pointed focused on the police officer’s perspective, and in so doing renders the officer’s 
whiteness both relevant and determinative.  
 
ii.. The Irrelevance of Race to the Reasonable Person Standard  
 Despite the Court’s acknowledgement that the relevant controlling legal standard 
clearly and explicitly requires a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances,” it 
implicitly concluded that the race of the parties in a citizen-police encounter was not a 
relevant legal consideration in determining whether the target of police questioning 
would reasonably feel an inhibiting amount of intimidation and coercion.  Thus the Court 
can be fairly understood to suggest that the fact that Bostick was Black and the two 
officers were white, was irrelevant to a judgment on the voluntariness of his purported 
consent to a search of his luggage.  
 Although the Court did not expressly address the issue of the racial identity of the 
parties to a police-citizen encounter, in fact by not recognizing race at all, and by noting 
that “the reasonable person standard…does not vary with the state of mind of the 
particular individual being approached, the Court implicitly ruled racial considerations 
out of bounds for judicial consideration.  This decision is quite shocking in light of the 
 
269 Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, supra at 976  
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substantial body of evidence and literature collected and disseminated not only by the 
academic community but by the police community as well, that clearly recognizes that 
the relationship between the police and non-whites generally, but especially Black men, 
is fraught with mutual feelings of “fear and loathing.”270 
The Court’s rhetoric of colorblindness masks the pivotal fact that in contemporary 
America the perceived race of the citizen is a principal animating and frequently 
determinative factor that both infects and inflects every encounter between the police and 
the public.  In short, whites and non-whites, but especially Blacks, are treated differently 
by the police, simply because they are perceived as white or non-white, or especially 
Black.271 
The Court could not possibly have been ignorant of the well known antipathy that 
exists between Black men and the police and the fact that “many blacks operate under the 
assumption that police/citizen encounters are potentially life threatening.272 Thus their 
failure to even address this issue in applying the reasonable person test, makes it clear 
that the Court felt that the race of the target of police interrogation is simply not a 
relevant consideration in determining how a reasonable person would react under 
similarly situated circumstances.  However, one could persuasively argue that unless the 
reasonable person similarly situated to Bostick were also racially regarded as Black, he 
would not be sufficiently similarly situated to be an accurate measure of appropriate 
behavior.    
 
270 Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, supra at 976 
271 Id …esp. his story about how the police did not know how to react to Black Englishmen speaking 
accented British until they could locate them racially in the Caribbean  
272 Carbado, (E)racing Race, supra at 1014 (“stereotypes about crime and criminality, and the nexus 
between police abuse and race, render the nature of …police encounters…qualitatively and quantitatively 
different for blacks.”)id.   
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iii. Multiple Interpretations of Reasonableness 
The Court’s reasoning reflects their view that there is only one interpretation of 
reasonableness.  However, the reasonable person test is amenable to multiple and 
antinomic interpretations based on their particular racial experiential perspectives. Thus a 
common racial experiential foundation would yield common interpretations.  Conversely, 
antipodal or completely opposite racial experiential foundations would necessarily lead to 
discordant and often even inconsistent interpretations.  This combination of non-
synchronous white versus non-white racial interpretations constitutes a critical racial 
paradox.  This racial paradox requires the law to choose between competing racially 
inflected experiential foundations as the arbiter of racial reality.  This choice is critical 
because in many cases it is likely to be outcome determinative.  Thus the Due Process 
Clause assures American citizens that the government will not make this choice 
arbitrarily, irrationally, or on the basis of bias or prejudice.  
At minimum the Constitutional guarantees of the Due Process Clause should 
ensure that the choice between controlling racial perspectives is based on a rational 
process.  However, at this moment in America’s history the Court makes this choice 
unconsciously, covertly, inarticulately and without the benefit of any rational evaluative 
process.  The Court chooses the white perspective as the default standard because it has 
been inclined to identify the white perspective with an assumptive mythology of unraced 
reality.  This myth of an objective unraced reality that is accessible only through the 
white perspective is insidious, seductive and deeply oppressive to those who do not share 
participate in the national myth.  
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Recognizing multiple racially inflected interpretations of reasonableness is not the 
same as suggesting that the reasonable person standard should varying “with the state of 
mind of the particular individual”273 involved in an encounter with the police.  Rather it 
represents recognition of only a binary distinction in perspective along a white versus 
non-white continuum.  Although there may be sub-perspectives within the non-white 
category representing ethnic or national boundaries, the resolution of those conflicts is 
relatively minor compared to the significance of rejecting the legitimacy of the white 
monopoly on legally recognized reality.  
The Court tries to solve this racial perspective paradox by defining one of its 
contradictory features out of existence.  However, the non-white perspective will not 
disappear just because the Court refuses to recognize its existence. The distinctly white 
perspective on racial reality has achieved its legal currency, interpretive dominance, and 
judicial legitimacy through the obfuscation of its own racial contingency and the 
rhetorical subordination of competing racialized perspectives and interpretations. This 
legitimacy is unearned, undeserved, and inappropriate because it has no rational basis and 
was not the product of a rational process.  Instead, it is the product of an irrational 
assumption of whiteness as an unraced, normative and racially objective lens on racial 
reality. Moreover, this white perspective is not the legitimate victor of a contest between 
competing racialized interpretations. Instead, it was implicitly declared beyond the reach 
of competing views and anointed the winner by the Court.  
 
273 Bostick, supra at 2388 (O’Connor J.,) 
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iv. The Black or Non-White Reasonable Person Standard 
The Bostick Court refused to take Bostick’s blackness into account in applying 
the reasonable person test.  In effect, ignoring the fact that Bostick is Black, and failing to  
acknowledge the white racialized character of the reasonable person standard is 
tantamount to the Court suggesting that a Black or any other non-white person will only 
deemed by the law to be acting reasonably when they are acting like whites.  Of course, 
neither this nor any reasonably politic court would ever explicitly hold that blacks must 
act white in order to be regarded as reasonable.  Yet the conception of the reasonable 
person as articulated by Justice O’Connor amounts to precisely the same thing.274 
Thus it could be argued that the aim of the white-centered-perspective is total 
domination, where non-whites are expected to eventually abandon their own non-white 
identity and perspective and act like, think like and to see both themselves and the rest of 
the world through the white-centered-perspective.  However, unlike ethnic Europeans 
who have long since made this deal and thus assimilated into whiteness, capitulation for 
non-whites will not make them into whites.  However, from the non-white-perspective, it 
will make them more palatable to whites and thereby facilitate continued white 
supremacy and dominance.275 
IV. Constitutional Concerns with White Innocence 
The rhetoric of white innocence creates and perpetuates a mythology of a 
generalized racial “innocence of law”276 which considers the legal landscape to be free of 
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systemic racial biases absent the insertion of race through affirmative action programs.  
In this way the constitutional rhetoric of white innocence reinforces white supremacy by 
legitimating the status quo as the product of racially neutral social, political and 
individualistic decisions and discursive dynamics.  Rather than being constructed by 
systemic and institutional racist practices and stereotypes, it posits that racism is only 
problematic to the extent that it is the product of the blameworthy actions of individual 
bad actors, who are motivated by conscious and intentional racism.  In this way, it 
reinforces the broad discursive innocence of whites collectively by locating racially 
discriminatory behavior outside the normative structure of whiteness, and characterizing 
it as aberrant and individualistic. 
 
1.  Due Process 
The Due Process Clause, "like its forebear in the Magna Carta ... was intended to 
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government' ...."277 
Thus, due process necessarily presumes both rationality and materiality.  That is, the 
essence of the Due Process Clause is a guarantee of a degree of reasonableness that 
matters – that makes a difference on the outcome.   
A process that makes no difference on the outcome is an irrelevancy and is no 
process at all.  Thus, if the white-centered perspective always wins and in so doing 
 
(“Liberal cosmology provides a particular protection of law’s innocence…[but] on the contrary racism is 
compatible with and even integral to law.”)id at 119, 121.   As if absent explicit governmental uses of racial 
categories to benefit non-whites, the competition for government benefits is in fact racially neutral territory 
and devoid of existing racially determinative influences; as if absent explicit racial remedies, the 
competitive scene is a racially pristine canvass uncontaminated by pre-existing and outcome determinative 
elements of highly racialized preference, privilege, and advantage.   
277 Note, IN THE HEAT OF THE CHASE: DETERMINING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLICE PURSUITS WHEN AN INNOCENT 
BYSTANDER IS INJURED, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 161, 1995 
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achieves a kind of unquestioned hegemony, it cannot be said to have been the result of a 
reasonable process.  Instead, it is evidence of a deeply flawed and broken process that has 
in a very real sense made whiteness the measure of realness.  The choice for non-whites 
under this despotic rule of the white perspective has been to either allow it to supplant 
their own racialized experience of the world, or to achieve a type of “bi-visuality” 
whereby they can be visually fluent in both racial perspectives.  
 Non-whites in America have always struggled to achieve a degree of mastery over 
this kind of racial bi-visuality of perspective as a survival mechanism. The need for such 
fluency began when the first chains of racialized slavery were forged in the English 
colonies, and continues to the present day to impress itself with frightening speed, 
intensity, and clarity on every non-white, but especially Black face that immigrates to 
America.278 Thus for non-whites in America, racial bi-visual fluency is an essential 
survival skill.  Some non-whites have always absorbed and accepted the non-white 
 
278 See, Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 958, 959 (2002) 
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perspective as their own and even preached it to their fellows279, however, the vast 
majority have historically and continue to choose bi-visual fluency over total perspectival 
surrender, occupation, and colonization by the white-centered-perspective.280 
Through the lens of the white-centered-perspective not only are whites perceived 
to be innocent, but the law itself is also similarly regarded.  The ideological 
underpinnings of this view is a form of judicial self-inflicted colorblindness, whereby the 
Court and the general public presume the law itself to be free of racial inflection, 
presumption or bias. From the non-white-centered perspective, the law constitutes a 
primary engine in the creation and perpetuation of both race itself and the racialization of 
society. When the Court adopts one of these perspectives as the controlling lens of a case, 
it has an obligation to at minimum explain its choice.   
However, instead the Court chooses the white-centered-perspective, not as the 
prevailing party in a contest between combatants, but rather as the naturally or divinely 
anointed seer of reality, as if there was never any real choice to make.  This choice is 
supported by neither reason nor logic, and thus, at is core it represents a fundamentally 
arbitrary assertion of governmental power that is anathema to a system grounded on due 
process guarantees.  This is true because any process that results in arbitrary decisions 
cannot possibly lay claim to being a “due process.”  In addition it constitutes a clear 
unconstitutional racial preference by government without even a colorable claim to 
advancing a compelling state interest or being narrowly tailored.  Thus, seeing racial 
reality through the white-centered-erspective inclines the Court to make arbitrary racial 
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preferences in favor of whiteness that are antipodal, meaning that they are simultaneously 
irrational, glaringly obvious, and totally invisible.   
 
2. Arbitrariness  
 
One of the most fundamental constitutional rights consists of the right to be free 
from arbitrary and capricious government decision making.  In order to survive 
constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
among others, government decisionmaking must have at minimum a rational basis.  In 
short, a fundamental requirement of ordered liberty in a participatory democracy consists 
of the right to be free of government decisionmaking grounded in bias, personal 
prejudice, or vindictiveness.  
 
V.  Recommendations 
 A.  Acknowledging Competing Racial Perspectives 
 If the Court were to implement the analytical approach that this article suggests, it 
could have significant implications for both the results and the constitutional analysis for 
future race cases.  For example, if we were to apply this approach to Croson Justice 
Scalia could not have simply argued that the Constitution forbids racial categorization per 
se and thus cannot accommodate the notion of benign discrimination.  He would have 
been constrained to acknowledge that although this reflects a legitimate construction of 
the Constitution, it is also based on a distinctly white perspective.  Public honesty would 
have then compelled him to acknowledge that from a non-white-centered perspective, 
and especially a black perspective, the racial prohibitions of the Civil War Amendments 
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are fundamentally anti-subordination in character and were intended to police racial 
categories only to the extent that they contributed to the creation or perpetuation of a 
system of subordination and racial caste.281 
From this perspective, racial classifications by the state are perfectly legitimate, 
so long as they do not create or perpetuate a system of subordinate racial caste.  Although 
Justice Stevens argues in Croson that the white business not favored under the city’s plan 
were stigmatized by the program,282 there can be no serious argument that affirmative 
action programs have in any way contributed to incarcerating whites as group to a lower 
and subordinated social class. Thus, it would to be conceded that taken from the starting 
point of the non-white perspective; benign discrimination plans by government do not run 
afoul of the anti-discrimination prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment unless and until 
whites as a group are realistically threatened with being reduced to a socially subordinate 
lower caste.  
Having distinguished the two competing threshold perspectives and the logical 
extension of both, one disallowing all racial categories on a per se basis and the other 
condemning such classifications strictly under the anti-subordination principle, how then 
does the court justify a choice of one over the other.  Neither has an exclusive command 
of the truth.  Each is premised on a distinctly racialized view of reality, and based on that 
logical foundation, leads rationally to its conclusion.  How then does the Court break the 
tie between competing perspectives?  Which ever perspective the Justices choose under 
 
281 See supra Section ____ 
282 See Croson, supra at 516 (ironically Justice Stevens refers to city’s set aside program as stigmatizing 
“the disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial discrimination,” however, he does not 
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these conditions, their reasoning would expose and reveal a great deal about their 
thinking with respect to the racial perspectives appropriate for the law to consider.   
A simple majoritarian justification would be seductive, but quite problematic.  
This is because at minimum it would inexorably lead to difficulty in those jurisdictions 
where whites have already become or are fast becoming a numerical minority.  
Moreover, nationally it has been estimated that somewhere between 2025 – 2050 
America will cease to have a numerically dominant majority race. Thus, with whites as a 
racial group in clear and inexorable decline as a numerical majority, a majoritarian basis 
would be very thin and shifting ground upon which to base a tie breaking preference 
between the competing racial perspectives.  Judicial expressions of personal 
identification with either perspective would be obviously inappropriate bases for 
distinction as well.  
A principled and rationally articulated, non-raced based distinction between the 
two perspectives would be indeed difficult if not impossible.  The Court would then be 
forced to consider a compromise between them thus, unlike the status quo, 
acknowledging a high degree of respect for both.  The ultimate result would thus be a 
product of policy and practicality rather than one fraudulently alleged to derive from a 
race neutral application of pure reason. As a compromise solution it would likely satisfy 
neither side completely, but both sides would participate to some degree in the final result 
and thus neither would be left out; no clear winner, but no clear losers either.  This 
approach is consistent with the finest traditions of participatory democracy and in fact 





The normative deployment of the rhetoric of white innocence in both the Supreme 
Court’s affirmative action and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrate that the 
Court is unreflectively locked into a white-centered-perspective or master framework in 
terms of its ability to perceive and understand America’s racial reality. As a consequence, 
this racially limited perspective distorts the Court’s appreciation for the full and balanced 
texture of racial reality in contemporary America and thus both limits its analysis and 
dooms its remedies to inadequacy and ineffectiveness in combating the nation’s real 
intractable racial problems.  
 The answer to this problem is simultaneously both deceptively simple and 
abstractly complex.  It begins with a simple act, as captured in Martha Minnow’s 
observation in the epigraph of this article, of recognizing that “any point of view, 
including one’s own, is a point of view.”283 From this simple act comes an implicit 
recognition of the existence and thus validation of opposing points of view. In this way, 
those, particularly the Supreme Court, who are locked into a white-centered-perspective, 
can come to recognize and appreciate that their views on racial matters reflect only a 
particular racial experience formed in a racially oriented culture that neither speaks for 
nor completely exhausts the metaphysical truth about America’s racial reality.   
Thus, through this recognition they can come to not only to appreciate their own 
perspective as both racialized and limited, but also simply as only a perspective, and thus 
to respect competing perspectives that may see the world through a different colored 
perspectival lens.  Without that threshold recognition the differences in racially inflected 
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perspectives “admit no common ground,” and result in “black and white Americans 
tak[ing] possession of distinct paradigms. In the extreme, blacks and whites look upon 
the social and political world in fundamentally different and mutually unintelligible 
ways…speaking across different theoretical paradigms.”284 As a consequence, “white 
and black citizens appear to have a terrible time talking to one another about race.”285 
However, despite the size of the gap that separates the white-centered from the non-
white-centered view of racial reality, it is not impossible to engage in “democratic 
discussion across the racial divide…but it is hard.”286 
A significant part of the problem in speaking across different racial paradigms is 
that the white-centered-perspective, especially as articulated by the Supreme Court, 
refuses to acknowledge that it is a racial paradigm or reflects a particular racial 
perspective. Therefore it cannot recognize the existence of any legitimate competition.  In 
the logic of this perspective, since it represents the objective truth, its only competition 
must be falsity, error or untruth.  Any dissenting opinions are thus derisively dismissed as 
interest based ideologies or identity politics and are engaged only for the purpose of 
enlightening them or bringing them up to the point where they can be converted to also 
see the world through the white-centered-perspective.  This is essentially missionary 
work to save the godless and savage soul, not political engagement with respected and 
worthy ideological opponents.  This is not a sound basis for deliberation.  By definition, 
such a perspective seeks not mutual respect but rather demands absolute surrender, total 
capitulation and thus assimilation.   
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recollections, by the blacks of the injuries they have sustained,” as Jefferson put it—could hardly be 
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Thus finding common ground requires first, attaining “a language of mutual 
respect,”287 because as Cornel West said so eloquently, we must come to “respect the 
scars and wounds of each other,” and hopefully through that process of mutual respect, 
also come to see the critical influence that those scars and wounds have in determining 
the perspectival line of sight form which we all experience and understand racial reality.  
This simple act of mutual respect and validation can potentially have deeply 
transformative and healing effects on America’s discordant racial dialogue, which in the 
end could allow us to talk about race more comfortably, productively, and realistically; as 
race is actually lived in America rather than merely how it is imagined and perceived 
thorough a white-centered lens.  This is a goal we must achieve if racial inequality is ever 
to be solved.  The work is hard but “the stakes are high”288 and thus failure is not an 
option.  
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